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THE BEARISH BANKRUPTCY
Diane Lourdes Dick*
Modern bankruptcy practice under Chapter 11
presumptively excludes the large and publicly-traded
corporate debtor's shareholders from the negotiation
table based on a longstanding assumption that they
have no economic interest to protect because most
bankrupt companies are insolvent. But bankruptcy
practice overlooks a shareholder's most important
economic interest: the right to enjoy the reorganized
firm's unlimited upside potential after all creditor
claims are satisfied. This interest, which is essentially
an option right, is totally ignored in the debtor's
hypothetical liquidation analysis. In a similar way,
the debtor's upside potential is not fully captured by
prevailing enterprise valuation techniques.
Of course, the economic uncertainties that drive
companies into bankruptcy-as well as the risks that
accompany most reorganization plans-also drive
down the value of equity's option right. In many cases,
the benefits to all other stakeholders of an efficient
reorganization will far outweigh the negligible value of
the upside rights. But in the case of commodity-based
firms that pursue bankruptcy reorganization in
declining or bearish price markets (what I call "bearish
bankruptcies'), economic theory suggests that the
upside potential is likely to be substantial. I argue that
by excluding shareholders from the negotiation table,
modern bankruptcy practice effectively severs equity's
option right at the outset of the case. Then, bearish
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Brooklyn Law School, the University of Wisconsin Law School Faculty Speaker Series, and
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debtors use a variety of complex and understudied
commercial instruments to eliminate uncertainty and
convert, in the earliest days of the case and with
minimal judicial oversight, certain creditors' limited
and fixed rights into unlimited upside rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At 11:00 a.m. on Friday, September 2, 2016, shareholders from
every walk of life filed into Judge Christopher Sontchi's courtroom
on the fifth floor of the red brick building housing the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. They came to hear
the court's decision about whether to confirm a corporate debtor's
proposed restructuring plan that would extinguish existing equity
interests and transfer the company to certain creditors.' Between
the regular courtroom and an overflow recess, several hundred
people were in attendance. Approximately half were individual
common shareholders of the large, publicly-traded debtor
company.2 Other equity holders joined telephonically, dialing in
from places as far away as Hong Kong.3
Even for one of the country's busiest bankruptcy venues,4 it was
an exceptional turnout for a plan confirmation hearing.
Meanwhile, some of the country's most respected financial news
reporters were already covering the case.5 By all accounts, this
Chapter 11 case unfolding just a few blocks from the Delaware
Court of Chancery-the country's leading referee of disputes
1 See Phil Town, American Justice and Investing- Horsehead Holding, RuLE #1 INVESTING:
BLOG, https://www.ruleoneinvesting.com/bloglinvesting-news-and-tips/American-justice-and-
investing-horsehead-holding (last visited Oct. 11, 2017) (noting that "the courtroom was
packed with shareholders" hoping to learn how Judge Sontchi would rule).
2 E-mail from Guy Spier, Founder and Managing Partner of Aquamarine Capital, to
author (Sept. 14, 2016, 11:32 EST) (on file with the author).
3 Town, supra note 1.
4 Most cases involving publicly-traded debtor companies are filed in the District of
Delaware or the Southern District of New York. See Laura Napoli Coordes, The Geography
of Bankruptcy, 68 VAND. L. REV. 381, 389 (2015) ("[T]he number of bankruptcy cases in
these two jurisdictions is staggering: as of 2011, seventy percent of the largest two-hundred
public-company filings since 2005 had been handled in either New York City or Delaware.");
Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of
Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 972 (1999)
(noting that forum shopping for bankruptcy courts has been focused on Delaware and New
York).
5 See, e.g., Peg Brickley, Horsehead Shareholders Press Challenge to Bankruptcy Plan,
WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/horsehead-shareholders-press-chall
enge-to-bankruptcy-plan-1466447397 (explaining the disagreement between Horsehead and
its shareholders); Gretchen Morgenson, How Bankrupt Is Horsehead Holding? Its Investors
Want to Know, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/28/busine
ss/how-bankrupt-is-horsehead-holding-its-investors-want-to-know.html? r=0 (describing the
background of the case).
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between and among corporate stakeholders6-was poised to offer a
well-fought victory for the growing legions of shareholders who
intervene in large Chapter 11 cases to protect their interests.7
The debtor in possession8-zinc producer and metal recycler
Horsehead Holding Corp., a Delaware corporation (Horsehead
Holding)9-was an otherwise obscure company doing business in a
non-public-facing industry. But the case had captured Wall Street's
attentiono months earlier when, notwithstanding the debtor's
insistence that it was hopelessly insolvent and that its shareholders
had no economic interest in the case, Zurich-based fund manager
Guy Spier delivered an impassioned pro se plea to the court to order
the U.S. Trustee to appoint an official equity committee to advocate
on behalf of shareholders." Spier and other investors pointed to the-
company's audited financial statements, which disclosed assets of
6 See Alana Semuels, The Tiny State Whose Laws Affect Workers Everywhere, THE
ATIANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/corporate-go
vernance/502487/ ("[T]he reason that corporations want to incorporate in Delaware is so that
their disputes will be heard by one of the five judges of the state's Court of Chancery .. ..").
7 Shareholders of Chapter 11 debtor companies increasingly attempt to come together to
gain influence in the proceedings. See Diane Lourdes Dick, Grassroots Shareholder Activism
in Large Commercial Bankruptcies, 40 J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (2014) (noting that "individual
shareholders of large and distressed publicly traded corporations in Chapter 11 bankruptcy
have increasingly engaged in direct action and grassroots organization in their efforts to
influence the restructuring" (footnote omitted)). For recent developments in leading cases, see
Ana Lucia Hurtado, The Equity Committee Trend When Shareholders of a Bankrupt
Company Hope to Get More Than Nothing, FORBES (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sit
es/maxfrumes/2016/10/14/the-equity-committee-trend-when-shareholders-of-a-bankrupt-comp
any-hope-to-get-more-than-noting/#6d8974d056b2.
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2012) (defining "debtor in possession" to mean the "debtor
except when a person . .. is serving as trustee in the case"). The debtor in possession
"generally has the authority to exercise the same powers as a trustee." Weingarten Nostat,
Inc. v. Serv. Merch. Co., 396 F.3d 737, 742 n.4 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a),
1108 (2000)). Unless the context indicates otherwise, references in this Article to the
"debtor" mean the debtor in possession.
9 Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy at 1, 6-7, In re
Horsehead Holding Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 2, 2016). Unless the context
indicates otherwise, references in this Article to "Horsehead Holding" and to the "company"
refer to Horsehead Holding Corp. and its debtor affiliates, together.
10 See, e.g., Len Boselovic, Shareholders Seek a Voice in Horsehead Bankruptcy, PITT.
POST-GAZETIE (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/Pittsburgh-company-ne
ws/2016/04/04/Shareholders-seek-a-voice-in-Horsehead-bankruptcy/stories/20160403114; Alex
Carlson, Horsehead Holding Corp Still Has Hope, INSIDER FIN. (May 9, 2016), https://insiderf
inancial.com/horsehead-holding-corp-otcmktszincq-still-has-hope//1 15432/#response.
11 Transcript of Hearing at 6, In re Horsehead Holding Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D.
Del. May 2, 2016) (on file with the author).
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approximately $1 billion1 2 and stockholders' equity of $434 million,13
as well as more recent unaudited financial data reflecting equity of
$458 million. 14  They claimed that the bankruptcy was the
unfortunate consequence of the company's technical default under a
relatively small line of credit, and that it was a robust enterprise
with supportive shareholders.16
For its part, the debtor insisted that its previously-released
financial statements were woefully out of date.16 But if financial
conditions had deteriorated so much, the company had made little
effort to communicate these changes to shareholders. The company
had failed to timely file its Form 10-K, with corporate officers
explaining in a Securities & Exchange Commission filing that,
[a]s a result of the Company's position prior to and
after filing for Chapter 11 . . . the Company has been
unable to dedicate financial and human resources to
the preparation of the Annual Report and has
determined that it is unable to timely file its Annual
Report without unreasonable effort or expense.17
Nonetheless, the company dedicated substantial financial and
human resources to resisting formation of an official equity
committee18 and to fast-tracking a plan of reorganization that
would take the company private.19
12 Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, supra note 9, at 6.
13 Horsehead Holding Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 36 (Mar. 2, 2015).
14 Id. at 63.
15 See, e.g., Rupert Hargreaves, Horsehead Holdings: A Failure of Capital Markets?,
VALUEWALK (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.valuewalk.com/2017/01/horsehead-holdings-guy-sp
ier/ (noting that two shareholders had indicated they were willing to finance the company
during hard times).
16 Debtors' Omnibus Objection to Motions for Appointment of an Official Committee of
Equity Security Holders at 10, In re Horsehead Holding Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del.
Apr. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Debtors' Omnibus Objection].
17 Horsehead Holding Corp., Notification of Late Filing (Form 12b-25) 3 (Mar. 1, 2016).
1s See generally Debtors' Omnibus Objection, supra note 16 (resisting formation of an
official equity committee on the grounds that the company was hopelessly insolvent, making
such a committee unnecessary and an inefficient use of the estate's scarce resources).
19 See Debtors' Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code at 22, In re Horsehead Holding Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 13, 2016) ("[A]11
Existing Interests shall be cancelled without any distribution on account of such Interests.").
[Vol. 52:437442
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In support of the draft plan proposing a debt-to-equity swap,
the debtors released an enterprise valuation analysis positing that
the reorganized company would be worth somewhere in the range
of $255 million to $305 million 20-an amount that, if accurate,
would mean that the company was deeply insolvent.21 And yet,
notwithstanding the gravity of such a revelation for shareholders
and many classes of creditors, the company conceded that, in
preparing this estimate and the separate hypothetical liquidation
analysis, "no independent valuations or appraisals of the Debtors
were sought or obtained."22
If shareholders had any hope of defending their interests, they
needed to do so during the Chapter 11 case. For one thing, a
prevailing equitable mootness doctrine makes Chapter 11 plans
virtually non-appealable once confirmed.23 And, although the
debtors' alleged deterioration in value hinted at viable causes of
action against management, the debtors proposed broad litigation
releases that would have effectively foreclosed any such lawsuits.24
For all practical purposes, it was now or never, and the
shareholders needed an official committee to lodge an effective
defense.
But the U.S. Trustee,25 evidencing a great deal of faith in the
debtors' claims of hopeless insolvency, refused to use its discretion
20 Debtors' Second Amended Disclosure Statement for the Debtors' Second Amended
Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at Ex. D, In re
Horsehead Holding Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del. July 15, 2016) [hereinafter Debtors'
Second Amended Disclosure Statement].
21 See id. at Ex. C (providing a detailed liquidation analysis of the company).
22 Id. at Ex. D.
23 Such was the experience of shareholders of Allied Nevada Gold Corp., who launched an
unsuccessful pro se appeal of the bankruptcy court's decision to confirm a reorganization
plan. See In re Allied Nevada Gold Corp., 565 B.R. 75, 84 (D. Del. 2016) (applying the
equitable mootness doctrine in refusing to decide the appeal because the reorganization
plan was "substantially consummated").
2 See Debtors' Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code at 40, In re Horsehead Holding Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del. July
15, 2016) [hereinafter Debtors' Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization] ("EACH
RELEASED PARTY IS DEEMED RELEASED BY THE DEBTORS, THE ESTATES, AND
THE REORGANIZED DEBTORS FROM ANY AND ALL CLAIMS, OBLIGATIONS,
RIGHTS, SUITS, DAMAGES, CAUSES OF ACTION, REMEDIES, AND LIABILITIES. . .. ").
25 References herein to the "U.S. Trustee" mean the relevant regional office of the U.S.
Trustee Program. In In re Horsehead Holding Corp., this means the U.S. Trustee for
Region 3, which includes Delaware. United States Trustee's Response to Motions of Guy
444 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:437
to appoint an official equity committee.26 And so, in a last-ditch
effort, Spier, a self-described follower of Warren Buffet's value
investing strategy and a firm believer in the company's intrinsic
value,27 filed a pro se motion requesting that the court order the
appointment of an official equity committee.28 The debtors,29 the
senior secured creditors,30 the unsecured creditors committee,31
and even the U.S. Trustee32 opposed Spier's motion. At a May
2016 hearing, Spier delivered stirring testimony on behalf of
himself and hundreds of individual shareholders from around the
world who filed joinders to his motion.33 The bankruptcy court
acknowledged that the case raised serious fairness concerns and
agreed that shareholders needed an official committee to
adequately represent them: "[t]o put it bluntly, something doesn't
smell right to the Court."3 4 That decision should have signaled to
Spier and Phillip Town for Appointment of Equity Committee at 1, In re Horsehead Holding
Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 22, 2016).
26 See generally Docket Sheet, In re Horsehead Holding Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D.
Del. Feb. 2, 2016) (showing no filing by the U.S. Trustee regarding an official equity
committee until Spier motioned for one's appointment).
27 See generally GUY SPIER, THE EDUCATION OF A VALUE INVESTOR: MY TRANSFORMATIVE
QUEST FOR WEALTH, WISDOM, AND ENLIGHTENMENT (2014). Value investing is further
explored in LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, WHAT IS VALUE INVESTING? 1-6 (2004), describing
value investing as compared to other investing styles, and noting its connection to Warren
Buffett.
28 See Pro Se Motion for the Entry of an Order Appointing an Equity Committee at 6, In
re Horsehead Holding Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 23, 2016) ("1 respectfully
submit that appointing an equity committee would go a long way towards redressing the
enormous imbalance of power that exists within this case.").
29 Debtors' Omnibus Objection, supra note 16.
3o Objection of the Ad Hoc Secured Noteholder Committee to the Motions for
Appointment of an Official Committee of Equity Security Holders, In re Horsehead Holding
Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 25, 2016).
21 Statement of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in Response to Motions
Seeking the Entry of an Order Directing Appointment of an Equity Committee at 4, In re
Horsehead Holding Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 25, 2016) ("mhe Committee
respectfully submits that Movants have not met their burden. The appointment of an
equity committee in these Cases is not appropriate at this time.").
32 United States Trustee's Response to Motions of Guy Spier and Phillip Town for
Appointment of Equity Committee, supra note 25, at 7 ("The Movants have not met their
burden to prove the necessity or appropriateness of an official committee of equity security
holders.').
22 Transcript of Hearing, In re Horsehead Holding Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del.
May 2, 2016) (on file with the author).
3 Id. at 100-01.
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all participants and observers that the case would chart an
extraordinary course.
Horsehead lived up to its potential, leading Judge Sontchi to
remark at the September plan confirmation hearing that his
decision to confirm the debtors' plan was "one of the most difficult
decisions I've had to make in ten years on the bench and one of the
closest calls that I've had to make."35 Rejecting accusations by
shareholders that the plan was not proposed in good faith because
the debtor had declined to put forth its best efforts toward
marketing and selling the company, Judge Sontchi reiterated a
foundational principle of corporate bankruptcy reorganization: a
debtor is not required to auction itself to the highest bidder, and
may focus its efforts on negotiating a debt-to-equity swap with its
existing creditors.36 Nonetheless, to be confirmed, a Chapter 11
plan must meet statutory requirements intended to safeguard the
interests of junior stakeholders.37 Because the debtors' proposed
plan would cancel existing equity interests for no consideration,
the plan needed to be "fair and equitable" to shareholders.38 This
means that under the plan, senior claimants must not receive
more than they are entitled to receive, thereby siphoning value
that would otherwise flow to equity holders.39 Judge Sontchi
explained: "If I'm going to confirm this plan, I have to make a
finding that it's more likely than not equity is out of the money. If
I can't figure that out, if it's a tie, or if equity's thesis is more
likely, then the plan can't be confirmed."40
Characterizing the case as a "battle of the experts on
valuation,"41 Judge Sontchi-himself an author of at least one
paper on valuation methodologies42-meticulously critiqued the
debtor's and the equity committee's expert testimony. After
making adjustments, Judge Sontchi arrived at an enterprise value
3 Transcript of Ruling on Confirmation Hearing at 7, In re Horsehead Holding Corp., No.
16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 2, 2016) (on file with the author).
36 See id. at 9.
3 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012).
38 Id. § 1129(b).
39 See id. § 1129(b)(2) (explaining the requirements for a plan to be considered "fair and
equitable").
40 Transcript of Ruling on Confirmation Hearing, supra note 35, at 11.
41 Id. at 7.
42 See generally Christopher S. Sontchi, Valuation Methodologies: A Judge's View, 20 AM.
BANKER. INST. L. REV. 1 (2012).
2018] 445
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of $653 million-a figure that he acknowledged was "roughly
equivalent to the 650 million dollars in claims"-placing
shareholders "at the very least, on the cusp of being in the
money."43  Yet Judge Sontchi still confirmed the plan and
permitted the debt-to-equity swap on the grounds that
shareholders had another hurdle to overcome: "the 85 to 100
million dollars of new capital that's going to be required" to repair
and revive the company's idled plant, and which was promised
pursuant to new equity funding agreements between the debtor
and its senior creditors.44 The court concluded that this "new
money" was pivotal to the reorganization and "ha[d] to come from
somewhere."45 In other words, although the court momentarily
acknowledged that the company may be solvent, a future capital
infusion that shareholders were not invited to participate in would
be the linchpin.46
As a technical matter, then, the case did not come, down to a
battle of the experts on valuation, and it demands more from
commentators than the usual hand-wringing about the challenges
of valuing companies in Chapter 11. Spier, who served as chair of
the official equity committee,. believed that the company was worth
far more than the debtor surmised. He ventured that, as
commodities prices recovered and the plant revived, the company
would be worth $1.5 billion within five years.47 This is why Spier,
like so many other shareholders, was not simply fighting for the
right to share in an immediate distribution of residual value. Just
as importantly, or even more so, he was fighting to retain the right
to enjoy the reorganized company's upside.
Spier and other shareholders imagined ways to maintain
equity's optionality, making creditors whole while still preserving
a stake in any future excess value. For instance, the debtor might
43 Transcript of Ruling on Confirmation Hearing, supra note 35, at 16.
4 Id.
45 Id.
46 In the confirmation order, the court declared that the company was insolvent,
presumably based on a tally that included existing claims and the promised capital
infusion. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Confirming Debtors' Second
Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at
13, In re Horsehead Holding Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 9, 2016).





have avoided bankruptcy altogether by conducting a rights issue to
raise needed capital from the equity markets.48 And within
bankruptcy, the company could have pursued a plan that would
have either left common shares intact and issued preferred shares
to creditors, or allowed existing equity owners to receive shares in
the reorganized company if the stock price were to trade above a
predetermined threshold by some future date. If it was intent on
taking the company private, the debtor could have auctioned itself
to the highest bidder and distributed the proceeds to
stakeholders.49 But practically speaking, these possibilities were
never on the table. Pursuant to agreements executed in the
earliest days of the case, the debtor had promised its senior
creditors that it would work quickly towards finalizing a plan that
was acceptable to them, and that it would not "solicit or engage in
any discussions with third parties regarding an Alternative
Transaction."50 And these senior creditors pressed for a plan that
would give them ownership of the company.51
Lamenting the court's decision to confirm the plan, Spier
acknowledged, "[w]e were not in a position to put the system on
trial."5 2 Indeed, that would be a tall order for any party to a large
and fast-tracked Chapter 11 case. But legal scholarship does not
face the same limitations and has the potential to support the
pursuit of justice through critical reflections on law and legal
practice.53 In that spirit, this Article takes up the baton, shedding
new light on the legal and historical underpinnings of bankruptcy
4 Guy Spier repeatedly urged the debtor to conduct a rights issue. See, e.g., Transcript of
Hearing, supra note 11, at 31-32, 38.
4 See, e.g., Bruce A. Markell, The Case Against Breakup Fees in Bankruptcy, 66 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 349, 364 (1992) ("[A]uctions are typically used to rank bidders and to award the
assets to the bidder with the highest valuation.").
60 See Interim Order (A) Authorizing The Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Secured
Financing Pursuant o Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code, (B) Authorizing the Debtors to
Use Cash Collateral, (C) Granting Adequate Protection to the Prepetition Secured Parties,
(D) Scheduling a Final Hearing, and (E) Granting Related Relief Ex. 1 at 57, In re
Horsehead Holding Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Interim
Order]; Horsehead Holding Corp., Current Report (Form 8K) 2 (July 11, 2016).
51 See Morgenson, supra note 5 (noting that "the company's dominant creditors ... typically
drive the bankruptcy process").
52 Hals, supra note 47.
53 See generally Robin West & Danielle Citron, On Legal Scholarship, THE ASSOCIATION




reorganization under Chapter 11. I argue-as I have
elsewhere4-that Chapter 11 fails to adequately protect
shareholders. But this work explores more fully the consequences
of that failure with respect to commodity-based firms that enter
bankruptcy in declining or bearish price markets (what I call
"bearish bankruptcies"). Equity holders are normally the only
stakeholders with a preexisting right to the debtor's unlimited
upside potential after all creditor claims are satisfied, but
bankruptcy law's failure to protect them means that this
potentially valuable right is left vulnerable. And nowhere is this
right more coveted than in the bearish bankruptcy reorganization,
where prevailing economic theory provides at least some assurance
that the debtor's business is only temporarily suppressed.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II introduces the bearish
bankruptcy reorganization and the unique challenges of valuing a
commodity-based firm using prevailing corporate valuation
techniques. Part III explores the relationship between a Chapter 11
debtor and the equity owners who normally lay claim to its
unlimited upside after all creditor claims are satisfied. Part IV
examines the relationship between a corporate debtor and its
dominant creditors, and also explores the ways in which parties use
certain devices and instruments in Chapter 11 to reallocate upside
rights. Part V investigates various reforms that may help to restore
fairness to bearish bankruptcy reorganizations. Part VI concludes.
II. BEARISH BANKRUPTCY EXCEPTIONALISM
In recent years, in addition to the usual roster of failed
companies and struggling retailers, so-called commodity-based
firms-meaning companies with the majority of their earnings
exposed to commodity prices55-have dominated most listings of
large5 6 Chapter 11 filings.57 For example, in addition to Horsehead
- See generally Dick, supra note 7.
55 The term "commodity-based firms," which is frequently used in corporate finance
literature, is similar to the term "commodity trading firms." See CRAIG PIRRONG, TRAFIGURA,
THE EcoNOMICS OF COMMODITY TRADING FIRMS 6 (2014), https://www.trafigura.com/media/13
64/economics-commodity-trading-firms.pdf (providing a brief summary of commodity trading
firms).
56 By large," I mean those cases that come within the definition of "mega-cases" used by
the Administrative Office of the U.S. courts:
448 [Vol. 52:437
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Holding, numerous mining companies,58 oil producers,59 oil
services providers,60 natural gas processors,61 and even a cocoa
producer62 have recently submitted to the jurisdiction of the U.S.
bankruptcy courts during periods of major contraction in their
relevant commodities markets.
To explain the large number of commodity-based filings, most
observers cite the consistently inverse relationship between the
U.S. dollar and commodity prices.63 As the U.S. dollar began to
strengthen in 2014,64 it pushed global commodity prices
extremely large case[s] with: (1) at least 1,000 creditors; (2) $100 million or
more in assets; (3) a great amount of court activity as evidenced by a large
number of docket entries; (4) a large number of attorneys who have made
an appearance of record; and (5) regional and/or national media attention.
LAURA B. BARTELL & S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, A GUIDE TO THE JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF
BANKRUPTCY MEGA-CASES 5 (2d ed. 2009).
57 See Chris Martin, SunEdison Joins Crowded List of Commodity Bankruptcies This Year,
BLOOMBERGTECHNOLOGY (Apr. 21, 2016, 9:57 AM), https://Bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016
-04-21/sunedison-joins-crowded-lst-of-commodity-bankruptcies-this-year (providing a list of
U.S. restructurings in 2016 and noting that the list "is dominated by energy and commodity
companies").
68 See, e.g., Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, In re Peabody
Energy Corp., No. 16-42529 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Apr. 13, 2016) (pertaining to a coal mining
company); Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, In re Noranda
Aluminum Holding, Inc., No. 16-10083 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2016) (pertaining to an
aluminum mining company); Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy,
In re Allied Nev. Gold Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 10, 2015) (pertaining to a
gold and silver mining company).
59 See, e.g., Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, In re Energy
XXI Ltd., No. 16-31928 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2016) (pertaining to an oil and natural
gas producer); Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, In re Sabine
Oil & Gas Corp., No. 15-11835 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2015) (same).
6o See, e.g., Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, In re Paragon
Offshore PLC, No. 16-10386 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 14, 2016) (pertaining to an oil services
provider); Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, In re Boomerang
Tube, Inc., No. 15-11247 (Bankr. D. Del. June 9, 2015) (same).
61 See, e.g., Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, In re Ultra
Petroleum Corp., No. 16-32202 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2017) (pertaining to a natural gas
processor); Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, In re Southcross
Holdings GP LLC, No. 16-20112 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2016) (same).
62 See Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, In re Transmar
Commodity Group Ltd., No. 16-13625 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2016).
63 See, e.g., Chuck Kowalski, How the Dollar Impacts Commodity Prices, THE BALANCE
(May 5, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/how-the-dollar-impacts-commodity-prices-809294.
This relationship is explored more fully in COMMODITY PRICES AND MARKETS (Takatoshi Ito &
Andrew K Rose eds., 2011).
6 See Andrew Hecht, The Dollar - Volatile, But The Path Of Least Resistance Remains
Higher, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 23, 2017), http://seekingalpha.com/article/4038404-dollar-volatil
e-path-least-resistance-remains-higher ("The great rally in the U.S. dollar began in May
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downward.65 Then, in each specific commodity market, other
forces-such as oversupply and diminished demand-have further
contributed to financial distress. Although some large companies
enter into multiyear sales agreements, swap agreements, and
other hedging arrangements to protect against fluctuations in
commodities prices, these contracts often provide only partial
protection, mitigating but not eliminating the effects of global
price declines.66 And, of course, many commodity-based firms
choose not to hedge price risks in their primary commodities
markets, as shareholders usually desire exposure to the natural
price fluctuations.67
In declarations explaining their reasons for seeking bankruptcy
protection, commodity-based debtors typically cite the decline in
prices and the general uncertainty and volatility in their relevant
commodities markets. They explain how these macroeconomic
pressures, when combined with high debt loads, contribute to
declining revenues from operations,68 difficulty effectuating asset
2014...
65 See, e.g., Ira Iosebashvili, Strong Dollar Steps in to Bolster Some Economies WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 16, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/strong-dollar-steps-in-to-bolster-so
me-economies-1484560820 ("[The U.S. currency's rally threatens commodity prices. .. .");
Dominic Schnider, Why Gold and Energy Can Make Gains This Year, BARRON'S (Feb. 1,
2017, 1:23 PM), http://www.barrons.com/articles/why-gold-and-energy-can-make-gains-this-
year-1485973407 (noting the slump in commodity prices "over recent years").
66 See, e.g., Declaration of Michael Magilton (I) In support of First Day Motions and (II)
Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2 at 24, In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., No. 15-
11835 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2015) [hereinafter Declaration of Michael Magilton]
(describing such hedging strategies).
67 See, e.g., TIM KOLLER ET AL., MCKINSEY CO., VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING
THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 46 (6th ed. 2015) ("There are also risks that investors positively
want companies to take. For example, investors in gold-mining companies and oil-
production companies buy those stocks to gain exposure to often-volatile gold or oil prices.").
68 See, e.g., Declaration of John T. Drexler in Support of Debtors' Chapter 11 Proceedings
and First Day Pleadings at 18, In re Arch Coal, Inc., No. 16-40120 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Jan. 11,
2016) ("As coal prices continued to decline, it became increasingly clear to the Company
that revenues from operations would not be able to support the Company's existing capital
structure ... and that a restructuring under chapter 11 was likely to be necessary.");
Declaration of Kevin Nystrom, Chief Restructuring Officer, Interim Chief Executive Officer,
and President of Boomerang Tube, LLC, in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day
Pleadings at 8-9, In re Boomerang Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247 (Bankr. D. Del. June 9, 2015)
(noting the "drastic drop in crude oil prices" and explaining that "[a]ccordingly, the Debtors'
revenues went down by 62%").
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sales,69 and other liquidity challenges.70 There is no question that
these market realities have the potential to cause severe firm-level
financial distress. At the same time, though, these commodity-
based filings (what I call "bearish bankruptcies") must be
distinguished from commercial bankruptcies that are caused
primarily by financial scandal, ill-fated strategic choices, and other
ongoing operational challenges, such as obsolete business models."1
This is because, notwithstanding the very real near-term financial
challenges caused by downward price pressures, commodities
markets are generally cyclical in nature. Although longer-term
shifts may occur in particular markets, analysts generally predict
that commodity prices will stabilize and even rise again in the
future.72 Professor Eduardo Schwartz explained the tendency for
commodities markets to self-correct thusly:
In an equilibrium setting we would expect that when
prices are relatively high, supply will increase since
higher cost producers of the commodity will enter the
market putting a downward pressure on prices.
Conversely, when prices are relatively low, supply will
69 See, e.g., Declaration of Michael Magilton, supra note 66, at 4 ('The decline in the price of
oil and natural gas has also affected the Company's ability to effectuate certain asset
sales. . .. ").
70 See, e.g., Declaration of Dale W. Boyles in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First
Day Motions at 18, In re Noranda Aluminum Holding Corp., No. 16-10083 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
Feb. 8, 2016) ("[Tlhe sustained decline in aluminum prices has only intensified the pressure
on the Debtors' business and capital structure. This has made maintaining acceptable
levels of liquidity impossible.").
71 Recent bankruptcy law scholarship explores these and other subcategories of Chapter
11 filings. See generally, e.g., Kara J. Bruce, Rehabilitating Bankruptcy Reform, 13 NEV.
L.J. 174 (2012) (examining the impact of recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
through the lens of retailer debtor companies); Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice
Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862
(2014) (examining bankruptcy cases involving debtors that are so distressed that they "melt
like ice cubes," burning through more cash than they earn each day).
72 Malcolm P. Baker et al., Alternative Models of Uncertain Commodity Prices for Use
with Modern Asset Pricing Methods, 19 ENERGY J. 115, 122 (1998) (characterizing
commodities markets as containing "temporary fluctuations in the short-run price and the
gradual return of the commodity price to its longer-run trend").
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decrease since some of the higher cost producers will
exit the market, putting upward pressure on prices.73
Of course, bankruptcy is one of the primary ways in which some
higher cost producers exit the market. However, to the extent a
bearish debtor uses bankruptcy to reorganize rather than liquidate
a commodity-based firm, it has chosen to remain in the market.
Naturally, the decision to reorganize rather than liquidate a
distressed firm should not be made lightly. As a fiduciary, the
debtor is required to act in the best interests of all stakeholders,
and must not chase highly uncertain long-term cash flows at the
expense of creditors who shoulder the risk of plan failure. At the
same time, though, the bearish debtor that has chosen to
reorganize has likely taken into consideration the cyclical nature
of its business. Assuming that the decision was based on an
assessment hat the upside potential outweighs the risks and
uncertainties, then the bearish debtor should be expected to
accurately value and fairly allocate the upside rights.
One complicating factor is that the debtor has wide latitude to
exercise its fiduciary duties as a bankruptcy case unfolds,74 and
courts show great deference to its business judgment75 and to the
n Eduardo S. Schwartz, The Stochastic Behavior of Commodity Prices: Implications for
Valuation and Hedging, 52 J. FIN. 923, 923-24 (1997).
7 Professor Lubben reminds us that although corporate debtors have ample discretion to
make decisions in bankruptcy, their actions are nonetheless governed by corporate fiduciary
duty law. Thus, many of the perceived problems in bankruptcy process are actually failures
of non-bankruptcy corporate law. See Stephen J. Lubben, The Board's Duty to Keep its
Options Open, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 817, 818 ('[If the tendency for debtors to show up in
chapter 11 with no option but to engage in a quick sale process is a problem, that problem
has its roots in nonbankruptcy corporate law."). The problems identified in this Article
certainly suggest a breakdown in corporate fiduciary duties; however, modern bankruptcy
process seems to be a contributing factor.
75 'The business judgment rule 'is a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action was in the best interests of the company.'" Official Comm. of Subordinated
Bondholders v. Integrated Res., Inc. (In re Integrated Resources, Inc.), 147 B.R. 650, 656
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)). In Chapter 11,
the business judgment rule manifests as a presumption that the debtor's decisions are
reasonable. See, e.g., Comm. of Asbestos-Related Litigants and/or Creditors v. Johns-Manville
Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 60 B.R. 612, 615-16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[The Code
favors the continued operation of a business by a debtor and a presumption of reasonableness
attaches to a debtor's management decisions."); In re Simasko Prod. Co., 47 B.R. 444, 449 (D.
Colo. 1985) ("Business judgments should be left to the board room and not to this Court. Only
452
THE BEARISH BANKRUPTCY
opinions of its professional advisors. The careless, rushed,
colluding,76 controlled, or corrupted debtor may take advantage of
these freedoms and autonomies and (1) greatly discount its own
upside potential and present value; (2) use an artificially
suppressed valuation estimate to argue that some creditors are
taking substantial losses, while others are bearing extraordinary
risks under the plan; or (3) insist that a debt-to-equity swap that
vests the upside rights in certain creditors is the only fair and
efficient way to restructure the company.77
Recognizing opportunities for debtors to use their powers to
prefer certain stakeholders, the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code78-
and the courts that have construed its provisions over the last forty
years-have sought to check debtors' influence with important
substantive protections for both senior and junior stakeholders. For
instance, the established doctrine of voidable preferences allows
trustees to avoid certain pre-petition transfers that violate
bankruptcy's distributional priorities.79  Extensive plan
confirmation requirements are designed to ensure that debtors
allocate value in accordance with bankruptcy's distributional
norms,80 with debtors bearing the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that these requirements have been
satisfied.81 And an evolving jurisprudence reminds courts to remain
in circumstances where there are allegations of, and a real potential for, abuse by corporate
insiders should the Court scrutinize the actions of the corporation." (citation omitted)).
76 Professor Anthony Casey highlights opportunities for collusion: "A senior creditor,
exercising control over the debtor firm, determines that a bankruptcy filing to facilitate
such a sale is the optimal strategy for the distressed firm. The debtor then files, and the
sale is accomplished." Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors' Bargain and Option-Preservation
Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 760 (2011).
77 Gary L. Kaplan, Understanding the Contents of a Chapter 11 Plan, LAW360 (July 30,
2013, 10:31 AM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/460563/understanding-the-contents-of-a-ch
apter-i-plan (explaining methods for debtors to provide value to "certain constituencies" that
may be "out of the money").
78 All references herein to the "Bankruptcy Code" or the "Code" are to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at Title
11 of the United States Code).
79 See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012) (authorizing the trustee to avoid certain pre-petition
transfers); id. § 548 (setting forth the powers of a trustee to avoid fraudulent transfers).
so See id. § 1129 (providing the requirements for confirmation of a plan).
81 See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Charter Commc'ns Operating, LLC (In re
Charter Commc'ns), 419 B.R. 221, 243 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("As Plan proponent, [the
debtor] bears of burden the establishing compliance with the factors set forth in Bankruptcy
Code section 1129."); In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591, 616 n.23 (Bankr. D.
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on the lookout for transactions-such as sales or settlements-that
are actually clever attempts by debtors to avoid these statutory
checks by engaging in disguised plans of reorganization.82
However, these substantive protections are only meaningful
with respect to assets and other sources of value that can be
identified and quantified by the court. The problem is that
prevailing bankruptcy practice fails to fully take into account any
anticipated recovery in the bearish debtor's relevant commodity
market, such that the debtor's value may be greatly
underestimated. Consider, for instance, hypothetical liquidation
analyses. In recognition of bankruptcy's absolute priority scheme,
a debtor pursuing a cramdown plan must make a showing that
impaired stakeholders are not receiving less under the plan than
they would be entitled to receive in a hypothetical Chapter 7
liquidation.83 But, as the name implies, this exercise is based on a
liquidation scenario, without regard for future upside. Given that
a bearish debtor's pursuit of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy would
constitute a final exit from the market at a low point in the
relevant commodities market, the utility of this exercise for
bearish bankruptcy reorganizations seems questionable. Because
the exercise assumes that the debtor will be dissolved, it also
assumes away the value of equity's option right.84 And yet, in a
reorganization, the debtor is clearly choosing to remain in the
market-likely because it places a high value on the upside
potential that the exercise demands we ignore.
Moreover, the exercise may even artificially suppress liquidation
values. Liquidation analyses are asset-based valuations; however,
debtors do not actually conduct appraisals. Instead, they typically
base the exercise on book values as disclosed in the most recent
Del. 2001) ("[The proponent must show that a plan is fair and equitable by a preponderance of
the evidence." (citing In re Briscoe Enters., Ltd., II, 994 F.2d 1160, 1165 n.26 (5th Cir. 1993))).
82 See infra Part IV.
83 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(C)(i). For instance, equity security holders must receive or
retain "property of a value, as of the plan's effective date, equal to the greatest of': (1) "any
fixed liquidation preference"; (2) "any fixed redemption price"; or (3) "the value of such
interest." Id.
84 In a similar way, hypothetical liquidation analyses exclude the debtor's valuable tax
attributes. See Diane Lourdes Dick, Bankruptcy's Corporate Tax Loophole, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2273, 2302 (2014) ("Testing the Chapter 11 plan against a hypothetical liquidation
naturally omits the debtor's valuable tax attributes from consideration, as they would be
extinguished when the liquidated debtor is subsequently dissolved.").
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audited financial statements, with adjustments made to
approximate less than optimal sales conditions. But financial
statements prepared in accordance with GAAP suffer from a
number of limitations,85 including that they reflect norms and
conventions that are designed to prevent the overstatement of
corporate earnings.6  Under a prevailing convention of
conservativism, GAAP directs companies to anticipate and disclose
potential future losses rather than identify and estimate potential
future gains.87 For instance, the value of inventory-including a
commodity-based firm's stockpiles-should be reported at the 'lower
of cost and net realizable value."8 8 This means that a commodity-
based firm may be required to take impairment charges in periods
of declining commodity prices; however, the rules do not similarly
permit it to increase the reported value in periods of rising prices.89
Financial statements also do not capture the value of a company's
(or a strategic investor's) rational decision to postpone sales until
prices stabilize, and may not even capture the value of a company's
hedging strategies.90
85 Some of these limitations are empirically examined in BARUCH LEV & FENG Gu, THE
END OF ACCOUNTING AND THE PATH FORWARD FOR INVESTORS AND MANAGERS (2016).
86 Of course, even then, financial statements may still be fraudulent or misleading. See
generally HOWARD M. SCHILIT & JEREMY PERLER, FINANCIAL SHENANIGANS (3d ed. 2010)
(analyzing manipulations in earnings, cash flow, and key metrics).
87 On conservatism as a basic accounting principle, see THOMAS R. ITTELSON, FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS 12 (rev. & expanded ed. 2009) ("Accountants have a downward measurement
bias, preferring understatement o overvaluation."). On the theoretical rationale for a
conservative bias, see Young K. Kwon, Accounting Conservatism and Managerial Incentives,
51 MGMT. SCI. 1626, 1626 (2005) (suggesting that "conservative accounting enhances the
incentive value of accounting signals with respect to . .. agency costs"); Young K. Kwon et
al., The Demand for Accounting Conservatism for Management Control, 6 REV. ACCT. STUD.
29, 29 (2001) (introducing a new rationale for conservative accounting, one based on the
idea that "the principal designs the accounting system to be biased conservatively in order
to efficiently motivate the agent").
88 CODIFICATION OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, Accounting Standards Update
No. 2015-11, at 1 (Fin. Accounting.Standards Bd. 2015).
89 Id. For a theoretical analysis of impairment rules, see Robert F. Gox & Alfred
Wagenhofer, Optimal Impairment Rules, 48 J. ACCT. & ECON. 2 (2009).
9o The accounting rules governing disclosure of hedging strategies are complicated and
currently undergoing review. As of this writing, the existing rules do not always allow
companies to use hedge accounting for commodity sales. See generally Codification of
Accounting Standards and Procedures, Topic 815: Derivatives and Hedging (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 2017) (setting forth the existing rules); Ken Tysiac, Hedging May Get Easier
Under New FASB Accounting Standard, J. ACCT. (June 7, 2017), https://www.journalofaccoun
tancy.com/news/2017/jun/hedging-may-get-easier-under-new-fasb-standard-201716825.html
(describing the existing rules and recent proposed amendments that appear likely to be
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Similarly, the methods that are traditionally used to measure
the debtor's enterprise value-which, in theory, should reflect the
reorganized company's expected growth potential9 t-may also be
unreliable when applied to bearish bankruptcies. Today,
enterprise value is used primarily to determine whether a plan
runs afoul of the requirement that no classes of senior creditors
have received value in excess of their allowed claims and at the
expense of impaired junior creditors and interest holders.92 In a
1941 case, the Supreme Court counseled that enterprise value
should be based on the reorganized company's earning capacity
rather than underlying asset values.93 It is interesting to note
that at the time of the Court's decision, in contrast to modern
bankruptcy practice, enterprise value was primarily analyzed to
protect senior creditors rather than junior impaired
stakeholders.94 The focus on future earnings was thought to
prevent debtors from advancing plans of reorganization when the
enterprise was unlikely to ever generate cash flow sufficient to pay
the claims, such that senior creditors would be better served by an
immediate liquidation.95 In situations of this sort, the debtor's use
of inputs determined under conservative accounting practices
would provide an additional layer of protection for creditors
bearing the ultimate risk of plan failure.
But today, enterprise valuation is almost always used to show
that the debtor is not transferring value to senior creditors in
adopted in the near future).
91 See IAN RATNER ET AL., BUSINESS VALUATION AND BANKRUPTCY 39-59 (2009)
(explaining the focus on future earning capacity rather than underlying asset values).
92 See, e.g., In re Granite Broad. Corp., 369 B.R. 120, 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("There
is no dispute that a class of creditors cannot receive more than full consideration for its
claims, and that excess value must be allocated to junior classes of debt or equity, as the
case may be."). This concept is thoughtfully explored in Douglas G. Baird & Robert K
Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673 (2003).
9 Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941) ("The criterion of earning
capacity is the essential one if the enterprise is to be freed from the heavy hand of past errors,
miscalculations or disaster, and if the allocation of securities among the various claimants is
to be fair and equitable.'). But the Supreme Court has never specified the methodology that
debtors and bankruptcy courts should use to make this assessment. See Peter V. Pantaleo &
Barry W. Ridings, Reorganization Value, 51 BUS. LAW. 419, 420 (1996) ("Few cases discuss in
sufficient detail how reorganization value is determined and the few that do make
fundamental errors in the way they either explain or apply basic valuation methodologies.").
9 See, e.g., Du Bois, 312 U.S. at 528-29 (discussing the rights of senior creditors as
compared to stockholders).
96 Id. at 524-26.
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excess of their claims. And in this context, the debtor's reliance on
inputs determined under conservative accounting practices has the
potential to lend credibility to plans that deliberately siphon value
from junior stakeholders. Indeed, prevailing earnings-based
corporate valuation approaches suffer from a number of
limitations, particularly when applied to commodities firms. As
Professor Aswath Damodaran warned, "most corporate valuations
are built with the current year as the base year," and "[wihile this
fixation of the current year's numbers is always dangerous, it is
doubly so with cyclical and commodity firms."96 This is because
any such valuation will tend to overemphasize macroeconomic
factors and underemphasize firm-specific characteristics.97 Thus,
for a bearish debtor that uses the current year's financial
statements as a base for its enterprise valuation, there is a danger
that the analysis will overemphasize the underlying commodity's
present position in its natural economic cycle.
To establish an earnings-based, unlevered98 enterprise value,
modern bankruptcy practice generally relies on discounted cash
flow (DCF)99 analysis to discount anticipated cash flows at the
debtor's weighted average cost of capital, using the debtor's after-
tax cash projections over a forecast horizon of at least five years
and the anticipated terminal value of the company at the end of
the period.1" In this way, DCF models use so-called present value
96 Aswath Damodaran, Ups and Downs: Valuing Cyclical and Commodity Companies
(Sept. 2009), httpi//people.stern.nyu.eduladamodar/pdfiles/papers/commodity.pdf.
9 See id. (noting the "volatility in earnings at cyclical and commodity firms, with macro
factors at play rather than firm specific issues").
98 Enterprise valuations should be calculated on a debt-free basis in order to demonstrate
the intrinsic value of the firm without regard for its capital structure.
9 See, e.g., Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 288 B.R. 678, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Many authorities
recognize that the most reliable method for determining the value of a business is the
discounted cash flow ('DCF') method."); In re Exide Techs., 303 B.R. 48, 63 (Bankr. D. Del.
2003) (describing how DCF is calculated). For instance, Horsehead Holding's valuation
analysis relied primarily on a DCF model. See Debtors' Second Amended Disclosure
Statement, supra note 20, at Ex. D (noting that the "estimate of the Enterprise Value of the
Reorganized Debtors is based on the results of its discounted cash flow ('DCF') analysis").
In fact, DCF has been the corporate valuation method of choice for nearly forty years. See
Jay W. Eisenhofer & John L. Reed, Valuation Litigation, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37, 100 (1997)
(noting that bankruptcy courts began to use DCF analysis in 1980).
100 See Stan Bernstein et al., Squaring Bankruptcy Valuation Practice with Daubert
Demands, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 161, 186-93 (2008) (exploring the use of discounted
cash flow methodology in bankruptcy law); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Impact of Modern
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mathematics to determine the firm's anticipated earnings, relying
on the debtor's own inherently subjective input estimates.101 And,
despite repeated pronouncements from the country's leading
corporate and bankruptcy law tribunals that DCF models should
only be used when reasonably reliable inputs are available,102
these models continue to be used even though they are often ill-
suited for bearish bankruptcies.
For one thing, DCF models notoriously fail to capture
"uncertainties and opportunities"-particularly the "less certain
upside."103  In the case of commodity-based firms, DCF models
naturally include, as a key determinant of revenue, assumptions
regarding cash flow from production, processing, transport, or sale
of commodities at certain prices and at certain volumes. Consider
the example of a company that primarily sells a commodity.
Although experts agree that the market price of that commodity
would be among the most important inputs in a DCF model, they
disagree as to whether and how price assumptions should be
adjusted to account for the commodity market's naturally cyclical
nature. Some might emphasize the inherent uncertainty of future
prices and recommend simply using today's prices for future cash
flow projections.104  But, as one business valuation expert
Finance Theory in Acquisition Cases, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 26-37 (2003) (exploring
applications of discounted cash flow methodology in corporate law court decisions).
101 For a thoughtful critique, see KEVIN J. DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY: How
CORPORATIONS AND CREDITORS USE CHAPTER 11 TO THEIR ADVANTAGE 165-67 (1992)
(describing how "the valuation process can be easily manipulated").
102 See, e.g., Adelphia Recovery Tr. v. FPL Grp., Inc. (In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp.), 512
B.R. 447, 471 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("DCF works best (and, arguably, only) when a
company has accurate projections of future cash flows .... ); Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com
Inc., No. Civ.A.19734, 2004 WL 1152338, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2004) ('The utility of a
DCF analysis .. . depends on the validity and reasonableness of the data relied upon."); In
re JCC Holding Co. S'holders Litig., 843 A.2d 713, 721 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding that there
were no "reliable recent long-term projections from which [the financial advisor] could
perform a DCF valuation analysis").
103 Donald Erickson & Bryce Erickson, Bridging Valuation Gaps for Undeveloped and
Unproven Reserves, OIL & GAS FIN. J. (May 1, 2011), http://www.ogfj.com/articles/2011/05/b
ridging-valuation-gaps-for-undeveloped-and-unproven.html.
104 See Christopher R. Lattanzi, Discounted Cash Flow Analysis Input Parameters and
Sensitivity 6, http://web.cim.org/mes/pdf/valdaychrislattanzi.pdf ("Some commentators argue
that it is futile to attempt to forecast future commodity prices and ... that ... valuation
should be based on the assumption that today's commodity prices will persist indefinitely into
the future").
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criticized, "this is tantamount to arguing that the most significant
determinant of future profits is today's commodity price."105
Although most experts agree that DCF models should make
adjustments for future commodity prices, such future prices are
"very difficult to predict and will differ even between professional
analysts."06 Many financial analysts in the energy sector use a so-
called random walk model to forecast future energy commodity
prices, taking into account the anticipated rate of growth and a
random deviation based on historical price movement.107  In
bearish bankruptcies, debtors frequently use then-prevailing
commodity futures exchange prices as the basis for DCF price
inputs.108  Other debtors simply assume certain future prices
without expressly disclosing how they arrived at these figures.109
Horsehead Holding, like some modern Chapter 11 debtors, did not
directly disclose the future zinc and nickel prices it used; rather, it
vaguely provided that it "assumed . . . prices during the Projection
Period generally in line with average analyst consensus
estimates.""i0 But even slight adjustments in price assumptions
can have a substantial impact on total enterprise value. In a
similar way, it can be difficult for DCF models to predict the
105 Id.
106 SVETLANA BAURENS, VALUATION OF METALS AND MINING COMPANIES 71 (2010), http://
ehrenworthsyme.com/casedeleon/Docs/ValuationofMining.pdf.
107 See, e.g., Paul G. Bradley, On the Use of Modern Asset Pricing for Comparing Alternative
Royalty Systems for Petroleum Development Projects, 19 ENERGY J. 47, 80 (1998) ("In order to
deal with some fiscal systems, it is necessary to extend [modern asset pricing] analysis to
projects where the cash-flows have a nonlinear structure."); see also, e.g., David G. Laughton,
The Potential for Use of Modern Asset Pricing Methods for Upstream Petroleum Project
Evaluation: Introductory Remarks, 19 ENERGY J. 149, 150 (1998) ("Historical estimates of
uncertainty can be determined fairly easily.'); Gordon Salahor, Implications of Output Price
Risk and Operating Leverage for the Evaluation of Petroleum Development Projects, 19
ENERGY J. 13, 40 (1998) ('The standard DCF project evaluation method, with its use of the
same discount rate in the valuation of all projects, does not appropriately consider the effects
of the different risks that arise from different project structures.").
10 See, e.g., Disclosure Statement for the Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of
Reorganization of Linn Acquisition Company, LLC and Berry Petroleum Company, LLC Ex.
F, In re Linn Energy, LLC, No. 16-60040 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2016) (noting that the
commodity prices used are based on the New York Mercantile Exchange).
109 See, e.g., Amended Disclosure Statement for the Debtors' Amended Joint Chapter 11
Plan of Reorganization Ex. C, In re Allied Nev. Gold Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D. Del.
Aug. 27, 2015).
no Debtors' Second Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 20, at Ex. B.
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volume of sales in a cyclical market, or the impact of any hedging
strategies that may be available.111
In recognition of the inherent limitations of DCF models,
debtors also routinely submit enterprise value estimates derived
from at least one alternative approach, with courts examining the
totality of the evidence to determine the best estimation of the
firm's value as a going concern.112  A common alternative
methodology is the comparable companies approach, which
compares the debtor's financial performance to those of its
publicly-traded peer companies and uses valuation multiples to
estimate the debtor's enterprise value.113 Another alternative
approach is the comparable transactions method, which examines
recent purchase prices for comparable companies.114  But both
methods suffer from many of the same limitations in the case of
bearish bankruptcies, and are useful only to the extent certain
adjustments are made. For one thing, peer companies are
suffering through the same bear market, and have likely taken
impairment charges that reflect conservative accounting practices.
Adjustments must also be made to the multiples used for valuation
purposes to offset the impact of bear market conditions on the peer
company data.115  Evidencing these and other limitations of
prevailing corporate valuation techniques, the recent bearish
debtor Arch Coal, Inc. estimated its enterprise value to be between
$324 million and $666 million.116 Based on this and other
evidence, the court confirmed a plan that extinguished existing
111 This critique is made in Aminul Haque et al., Estimation of Mining Project Values
Through Real Option Valuation Using a Combination of Hedging Strategy and a Mean
Reversion Commodity Price, 25 NAT. RESOURCES RES. 459, 459-60 (2016) ("DCF methods
often fail ... to incorporate de-risking hedging strategies.").
112 See, e.g., CONTESTED VALUATION IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: A COLLIER MONOGRAPH,
¶ 3.03(2)(a) (Robert J. Stark et al. eds., 2011) (explaining that experts in bankruptcy cases
tend to deliver a valuation range using multiple methodologies).
113 See generally MATTHIAS MEITNER, THE MARKET APPROACH TO COMPARABLE COMPANY
VALUATION (2006). See also Agranoff v. Miller, 791 A.2d 880, 892 (Del. Ch. 2001) (explaining
the "comparable companies method of valuation').
114 The approach is described in DONALD M. DEPAMPHILIS, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND
OTHER RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITIES 263-64 (7th ed. 2014).
116 Examples are provided in ROBERT A.G. MONKS & ALEXANDRA REED LAJOUX,
CORPORATE VALUATION FOR PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT 278-79 (2011).
116 Disclosure Statement for Debtors" Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code Ex. D, In re Arch Coal, Inc., No. 16-40120 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. July 6, 2016).
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equity for no consideration and transferred ownership to certain
creditors.117 However, upon exiting bankruptcy, the publicly-
traded stock of the reorganized company soon traded at more than
$70 per share,118 representing a market capitalization of more
than $1.7 billion. 119 The stunning discrepancy highlights the
disconnect between valuation estimates and market-based
assessments-the latter likely takes into account the upside
potential that the former so poorly reflects.
In Chapter 11, prevailing corporate valuation approaches are
rendered even less reliable by the fact that debtors typically
submit all of their financial disclosures in summary form, riddled
with legal disclaimers.120  Bankruptcy courts, for their part,
typically decline to conduct independent examinations.1 2 1 Instead,
they show great deference to the debtor's business judgment and
to the opinions of its experts, and encourage parties to negotiate to
reach consensus.122 They also assume that, as a last resort, parties
will litigate the matter. In this way, modern bankruptcy practice
relies on parties in interest to advocate on their own behalf in
order to bring admittedly imprecise financial disclosures into
better alignment with the parties' own expectations regarding the
company's inherent value and growth potential.
These deliberations are important in all cases, but even more so
in bearish bankruptcies where it is most likely that the debtor's
business is only temporarily suppressed, such t at the right to the
117 Order (i) Approving Disclosure Statement; (ii) Approving Solicitation and Notice
Materials; (iii) Approving Forms of Ballots; (iv) Establishing Solicitation and Voting
Procedures; (v) Establishing Procedures for Allowing and Estimating Certain Claims for
Voting Purposes; (vi) Scheduling a Confirmation Hearing, and (vii) Establishing Notice and
Objection Procedures at 3-5, In re Arch Coal, Inc., No. 16-40120-705 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. July
8, 2016).
11 ARCH - Arch Coal Inc (New), INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/markets/st
ocks/arch/historical/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).
115 Arch Coal Exits Bankruptcy-An Analysis, SEEKINGALPHA (Oct. 10, 2016), https://seek
ingalpha.com/article/4011156-arch-coal-exits-bankruptcy-analysis.
120 On the hollowing of plan confirmation safeguards generally, see Diane Lourdes Dick,
Valuation in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: The Dangers of an Implicit Market Test, 2017 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1487.
121 See id. at 1497 (explaining how bankruptcy courts have relied on so-called implicit
market tests to support non-challenged self-evaluations by the debtors because it "frees
bankruptcy courts from the uncomfortable task of confirming plans on the basis of
admittedly weak disclosures").
122 The tendency to rely on negotiations is examined more thoroughly in Diane Lourdes
Dick, The Chapter 11 Efficiency Fallacy, 2013 BYU L. REV. 759.
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debtor's full and unlimited upside potential will be most highly
coveted. The prevailing wisdom suggests that if all or even most of
the stakeholders truly believe that the company is poised to make
an impressive rebound, then they will negotiate-or, if necessary,
litigate-for a reorganization plan that appropriately reflects and
fairly allocates the upside potential.123
In some ways, modern practice lives up to this expectation, as
bearish bankruptcies tend to be highly contentious. But the
theory ignores a glaring problem: as the following Part shows, the
very stakeholders with preexisting rights to the debtor's unlimited
upside potential after all creditor claims are satisfied-equity
security holders-are routinely shut out of the deliberations and
denied procedural rights that would allow them to more effectively
defend their interests. In a frustratingly circular design,
bankruptcy law and practice declines to fully take into account the
debtor's unlimited upside potential, even though it may be a
shareholder's most important economic interest. Then, it denies
shareholders important procedural protections on the grounds that
they have no economic interest to protect. The following Part
explores these and other aspects of the debtor's relationship with
its most junior stakeholders.
III. THE BEARISH DEBTOR AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS
When a publicly-traded company like Horsehead Holding files
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, its shareholders are understandably
concerned. This is because, as a Barron's reporter colorfully
observed, "[s]hareholders usually get burned in bankruptcy
court."12 4  At least on the surface, the Bankruptcy Code
contemplates shareholder involvement. Chapter 11's provisions on
party standing provide that each and every equity security holder
is a "party in interest," with a right to "raise and ... appear and be
heard on any issue."125 The term "equity security holders" includes
any person who holds an "equity security of the debtor,"126 with
123 See id. at 768 ("[Modern economic theory] asserts that persons engage in negotiation as
rational actors who make decisions intended to advance self-interest.").
124 Bill Alpert, Shareholders Fight to Keep Peabody Stock, BARRON'S (Jan. 14, 2017), http://
www.barrons.com/articles/shareholders-fight-to-keep-peabody-stock-1484378078.
125 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2012).
126 Id. § 101(17).
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"equity security" meaning, in the case of corporations, shares or
similar securities.127
But while the Bankruptcy Code makes repeated reference to
equity security holders, it is careful to distinguish them from
"creditors," which include persons with a "claim"128 against the
debtor or the debtor's estate.129 Creditors are expected to file proofs
of claim to preserve their rights to payment on account of their
claims, while shareholders may file proofs of interest to delineate
any rights they may have to a distribution on account of their equity
interests.130 The Fourth Circuit explained the importance of so
cataloguing claims and interests at the outset of a case: "[T]he
[Bankruptcy] Code's priority scheme requires a determination of
whether a particular obligation is debt or equity."131
Within or outside of bankruptcy, debt and equity are
fundamentally different. Corporate finance theory generally
recognizes that debt provides a promised, fixed return.132 This is
in contrast to equity, which does not offer a guaranteed return, but
rather a residual ownership stake in the firm's assets and cash
flows, with unlimited upside potential.133 Consistent with these
principles, state corporate law recognizes shareholders as the only
residual claimants of solvent corporations; this means that in a
liquidation scenario they are entitled-after the corporation's
payment of all debts and other liabilities-to the corporation's
residual asset value.134 Bankruptcy's absolute priority rule also
127 Id. § 101(16)(A).
12 Id. § 101(5).
129 Id. § 101(10). See also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2014) (providing that the commencement of
a bankruptcy case creates an estate comprised of, among other things, "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case").
130 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012).
131 Fairchild Dornier GMBH v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Dornier
Aviation (N. Am.) Inc.), 453 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2006).
132 See, e.g., STEVE LUMBY & CHRIS JONES, CORPORATE FINANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE
397 (7th ed. 2003) (explaining that "holders or suppliers of debt capital usually receive a
contractually fixed annual percentage return on their loan").
133 See id. (explaining that equity holders become part-owners of the company and that
their "annual return ... is not contractually fixed"); see also STEPHEN A. Ross, RANDOLPH
W. WESTERFIELD & BRADFORD D. JORDAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 24 (7th
ed. 2006) ("Equity holders are only entitled to the residual value, the portion left after
creditors are paid.").
134 See Ross, WESTERFIELD & JORDAN, supra note 133, at 24 ("If the firm sells its assets
and pays its debts, whatever cash is left belongs to the shareholders.").
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acknowledges these fundamental differences in important ways:
equity interests are always junior to creditor claims, and a
Chapter 11 plan is only "fair and equitable" with respect to a
dissenting class if the plan either provides for payment in full for
all members of that class or if, under the plan, no holder of any
junior claim or interest receives a distribution.13 5 But corporate
law also recognizes shareholders as residual claimants of insolvent
corporations; although their interests rank below creditor claims,
such that they would not be entitled to a distribution upon
liquidation of the insolvent firm, they are still owed normal
fiduciary duties.136  This is because, to the extent the firm
continues as a going concern, equity owners essentially have an
option right to the firm's future excess residual value.137
Unfortunately, as the previous Part explained, the value of
equity's option right is poorly reflected in prevailing corporate
valuation techniques, leaving bankruptcy law to largely overlook
this interest.
Of course, the Bankruptcy Code offers some procedural
protections for shareholders; however, these are discretionary
rather than mandatory, and an evolving jurisprudence has shifted
a heavy burden of proof onto shareholders while raising the
standard for granting relief. Of course, these challenges
ultimately impact not only shareholders, but also unsecured
creditors, who are first in line to receive any excess value and may
benefit from the influence of both classes of residual stakeholders.
The following sections illustrate these and related failings of
modern bankruptcy law and practice.
A. INITIAL NOTICE AND INFORMATION REGARDING THE BANKRUPTCY
CASE
As an initial matter, shareholders may not even receive notice
of the company's bankruptcy filing as quickly as creditors receive
1- 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(C) (2012).
136 See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92,
101-02 (Del. 2007) (noting that in these situations "creditors ... have standing to maintain
derivative claims against directors on behalf of the corporation for breaches of fiduciary
duties").
137 See, e.g., Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. EcoN. 637, 637-38 (1973) (theorizing that equity owners have call
options on the corporation's assets).
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notice. Of course, public companies are required to report certain
material corporate events on Form 8-K, which is filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) and made
available to the public.138 A company's filing for bankruptcy
protection is a triggering event requiring disclosure on Form 8-K,
and the debtor has four business days to make the requisite
filing. 139 In addition, debtors are required to deliver a notice of
commencement to their stakeholders, which contains important
information about the decision to file for bankruptcy,140 as well as
such other notices that the court deems useful or necessary.141
Such documents are typically delivered to the creditors and
interest holders identified by the debtor on a master service list.142
However, in the case of a publicly-traded debtor, because most
equity interests are held by banks, brokers, dealer agents, and
other nominees and agents, service of the notice of commencement
is typically made upon these persons so that they may distribute to
beneficial owners. Because the notice of commencement is often
sent days or even weeks after a bankruptcy case is initiated-and
individual shareholders must wait for their agents or brokers to
distribute copies-shareholders will typically learn about the
bankruptcy through the news rather than from direct or indirect
communication from the company. Indeed, in a publication
designed to provide information that every public stock investor
should know about corporate bankruptcy, the SEC acknowledged
this reality: "[Y]ou may first learn about a bankruptcy in the
news."1
43
138 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FORM 8-K, Item 1.03, https://www.sec.gov/
files/form8-k.pdf (requiring disclosure if a receiver is appointed or if the company becomes
subject to the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court).
139 Id. at 2 ("Unless otherwise specified, a report is to be filed or furnished within four
business days after the occurrence of the event.").
140 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(d).
141 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(d) advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment ("[here
may be other events or matters arising in a case as to which equity security holders hould
receive notice. These are situations left to determination by the court.").
142 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(a)(3).
143 Bankruptcy: What Happens When Public Companies Go Bankrupt, SEC: INVESTOR




Consider, too, the § 341 meeting of the creditors,144 which must
be held no fewer than twenty-one and no more than forty days
after a case is filed.145 At these meetings, the U.S. Trustee
provides an overview of both the Chapter 11 bankruptcy process
and the particular case, and responds to questions.146 The debtor's
attorneys provide important status updates and a representative
of the debtor may testify under oath.147 Many observers are
surprised to learn that the Bankruptcy Code provides that the
U.S. Trustee may convene a similar meeting of equity security
holders.148 In legislative history, Congress explained that "such a
meeting would be beneficial or useful, for example, in a Chapter 11
reorganization case where it may be necessary for the equity
security holders to organize in order to be able to participate in the
negotiation of a plan of reorganization."1 49  Notes from the
rulemaking advisory committee further explain that, in cases
where the trustee has declined to exercise its discretion to convene
a § 341(b) meeting of equity security holders, the court may order
such a meeting.150 But these meetings are almost never held, and
a search could not locate a single case where a bankruptcy court
ordered the trustee to hold a meeting of equity security holders.
B. PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION IN THE BANKRUPTCY CASE
Shareholders continue to face logistical challenges as they
attempt to navigate the confusing landscape of Chapter 11
bankruptcy. These challenges are not unique to shareholders;
unsecured creditors also struggle to understand their rights and
obligations as parties in interest to large Chapter 11 cases. But
while it has become customary practice for large corporate debtors
to provide resources to assist unsecured creditors, there is no
similar protocol with respect to shareholders. For instance, under
federal and local bankruptcy rules, debtors in large commercial
144 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2012).
145 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(a).
146 See 3 U.S. TRUSTEE PROGRAM POLICY AND PRACTICES MANUAL 73-77 (2016), https://
www.justice.gov/ust/file/volume_3_chapter_ 1_case administration.pdf/download (describing
the trustee's duties during a section 341 meeting).
147 Id. at 76.
14 11 U.S.C. § 341(b) (2012).
149 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 42 (1978).
1- 11 U.S.C. § 341(b) editor's and revisor's notes for § 341.
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cases are authorized or, at times, required to retain a so-called
claims and noticing agent to provide important notices to creditors
and to maintain a register of claims.15 1 While some of the agent's
services will be useful to shareholders as well as creditors, many
services address only the needs of unsecured creditors. For
example, agents typically establish call centers to assist creditors.
Evidencing an orientation towards creditors' needs, one of the
largest claims and noticing agents advertises call center
capabilities that may be "tailored to the needs of your creditor
body" and staffed with agents who are "experienced at handling
claims inquiries."152 Without any similar support systems in place
for shareholders, they struggle with many basic aspects of case
participation. For instance, Chapter 11 case dockets regularly
reflect proofs of claim filed by shareholders who strictly hold
equity positions,153 and some shareholders even attempt to litigate
the debtor's routine objections to these improperly filed claims.154
These and other errors suggest a need for a dedicated shareholder
advocate in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
But shareholders face their greatest challenges when it comes
to acquiring a seat at the bankruptcy negotiation table. Because
many of the key decisions in a Chapter 11 case are reached by
party consensus rather than judicial edict,155 it is extremely
important for widely-dispersed stakeholders to come together as a
collective body to negotiate with the debtor and its senior
creditors.15 6 In recognition of this reality, the Bankruptcy Code
directs the U.S. Trustee to form an official committee to advocate
on behalf of unsecured creditors.15 7 However, the appointment of
16 See, e.g., U.S. BANKR. CT. R. S.D.N.Y., LBR 5075-1 (indicating that the court may direct
the use of agents to file court records, issue notices, maintain case dockets, and disseminate
other administrative information).
152 Contact Center, EPIQ SYSTEMS, http://www.epiqsystems.com/how-we-help/corporate-re
structuring-chapter- 11/services/contact-center (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
15s See, e.g., Debtors' Tenth Omnibus Objection to Disallow and Expunge Equity Interest
Claims at 2, In re SunEdison, Inc., No. 16-10992 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2017)
(submitting an application for an order "disallowing and expunging certain proofs of claims
based solely on the claimants' purported equity ownership interest in the Debtors").
154 See, e.g., Objection to the Fourteenth Omnibus Claims, In re SunEdison, Inc., No. 16-
10992 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2017) (objecting to the debtor's routine objections).
155 Dick, supra note 122, at 766.
16 See id. at 821 (noting that "collective action confers benefits that privilege the interests of
certain stakeholders over those of other stakeholders who are not able to effectively organize").
157 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2012).
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an official committee of equity security holders is merely
discretionary.15 8 Nonetheless, upon request by a party in interest,
the court may order the U.S. Trustee to form an equity committee
"if necessary to assure adequate representation."15 9 Of course,
even without an official committee, shareholders may still mobilize
and participate in the proceedings. For instance, shareholders
frequently form ad hoc committees using social media and other
internet platforms to overcome their collective action obstacles in
order to develop litigation strategies.160 But without a so-called
statutory committee,161 even well-organized shareholders do not
have the same discovery powers granted to official committees.
162
They are also not entitled to payment of professional fees and
expenses from the debtor's estate, except in those very rare
instances where the court later finds that such parties have made
a substantial contribution.163
To understand why official equity committees are discretionary
rather than mandatory under the Bankruptcy Code, it is helpful to
revisit legislative deliberations concerning these and related
provisions. In 1970, Congress established a nine-member
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States (the
Commission)164 to study whether and how to amend and restate
the federal bankruptcy statute that had been in effect since 1898
(the 1898 Act).165  Initially, Congress was concerned with
"eliminating . .. economic waste"166 and addressing perceived
weaknesses in the consumer bankruptcy laws.
167  Later, the
Senate Committee on Finance reported that the draft legislation
was intended
158 Id.
1e 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2).
160 See Dick, supra note 7, at 4, 30 (analyzing the rise of this form of shareholder activism).
161 This term is intended to distinguish ad hoc committees from those official committees
formed under 11 U.S.C. § 1102.
162 See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (2012) (providing the powers of official committees formed under
§ 1102).
163 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) (2012).
164 Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
165 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544-66 (repealed 1978).
166 H.R. REP. No. 91-927, at 1 (1970).
167 See id. at 2 ("[T]he present body of laws comprising our bankruptcy system is obsolete,




to make bankruptcy procedures more efficient, to
balance more equitably the interests of different
creditors, to give greater recognition to the interests of
general unsecured creditors who enjoy no priority in
the distribution of the assets of the debtor's estate, and
to give the debtor a less encumbered 'fresh start' after
bankruptcy.168
Under the 1938 amendment to the 1898 Act, three separate
statutory chapters dealt with corporate reorganizations.16 9 Chapter
X, which addressed large, publicly-traded corporations,
contemplated the appointment of a disinterested trustee to replace
the debtor's management170 and the submission of all
reorganization plans to the SEC for review and for the issuance of
an advisory report.171 Indeed, the SEC played an active role in
these proceedings, having explicit statutory authority to interpret
and apply provisions of the 1898 Act.1 72  Meanwhile, judicial
decisions supplemented the statutory scheme with a number of
special protections for creditors and shareholders. A more
simplified set of rules codified in Chapter XI allowed smaller,
privately-held companies to reorganize and remain in possession of
the business. But a so-called "arrangement" under Chapter XI
could impair only the claims of unsecured creditors, and could not
affect equity security interests.173 The SEC was a statutory notice
party under Chapter X proceedings, and had the power to intervene
to transfer cases from Chapter X to Chapter XI.174 Finally, Chapter
XII addressed the unique needs of individuals and businesses with
debts primarily secured by real estate collateral.175
168 S. REP. No. 95-1106, at 1 (1978).
169 See Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 883--930 (1938) (adding chapters X, XI,
and XII to the 1898 Act for the purpose of corporate reorganization) (repealed 1978).
170 Id. at 888.
171 Id. at 890-91.
172 See Eugene V. Rostow & Lloyd N. Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate
Reorganization: Chapters X and X of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1334, 1335 (1939)
(noting that "Chapter X is principally the work of the Securities and Exchange Commission").
173 See id. at 1342 ("[A]rrangements under Chapter XI directly affect only unsecured
debt .... ).
174 See id. at 1363 (describing how section 147 of Chapter X provides a mechanism to
transfer cases improperly filed under Chapter XI to Chapter X).
175 See Act of June 22, 1938, 52 Stat. at 917 (defining "debtor" for purposes of Chapter XII).
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Over the 1898, and then the 1938, Act's long tenure, commercial
debtors increasingly came to see Chapter X as overly burdensome
and began to use the more streamlined Chapter XI.176 This, in
turn, led to inefficiencies and delays as parties spent considerable
time litigating whether a debtor belonged in Chapter X or Chapter
XI.177 On the Commission and in Senate subcommittee hearings,
heated discussion focused on whether and how to merge Chapters
X, XI, and XII into a unified corporate reorganization statute.78
Prominent restructuring attorneys testified in favor of leaving the
debtor in possession of the business, as was the case under
Chapter XI, rather than requiring the appointment of a
disinterested trustee, as was required under Chapter X.179 After
hearing evidence from the attorneys that the debtor-in-possession
model was more efficient, the presiding Senator DeConcini of
Arizona asked, "Who would be appointed to represent the
stockholders?"1 80  In response, Wall Street bankruptcy attorney
Jack Gross explained, "[T]hey can retain counsel and diligently
pursue whatever rights they might have."'8 '
Senator DeConcini seemed unconvinced and continued to
advance the line of questioning. Referring back to the existing
corporate reorganization statutes to help frame the problem he
was identifying, he pressed further: "What does the small investor
do? He cannot go and retain counsel. How does he get
representation if it remains in chapter XI?"182 Unfortunately,
though, the Senator's reference to Chapter XI muddied the issue
somewhat, as another of the testifying attorneys quickly clarified,
176 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200 Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judiciary Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong. 583 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Jack Gross, attorney, Kraus, Hirsch
& Gross) (noting the "preference of lending institutions for chapter XI proceedings than
chapter X proceedings").
177 See id. (noting the "waste of time that goes on in the courts in determining whether a
matter properly belongs in chapter X or chapter XI").
178 See, e.g., id. ("The concept of one chapter to deal with the rehabilitation of distressed
debtors has met universal acclaim: From debtors' counsels, institutional lenders' counsels,
the national bankruptcy conference, et cetera.").
179 See id. at 584 ("[T]he appointment of a disinterested trustee imposes on the creditors in
an estate the cost of on-the-job training by, true, a disinterested trustee, but one who
generally lacks the experience to conduct the business of the debtor.").
180 Id. (statement of Dennis DeConcini, Sen., Ariz.).
181 Id. at 585 (statement of Jack Gross, attorney, Kraus, Hirsch & Gross).
182 Id. (statement of Dennis DeConcini, Sen., Ariz.).
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"The stockholders in chapter XI under the current system retain
their position as stockholders. You cannot affect a stockholder in
chapter XI."183 Indeed, as Professors Walter Blum and Stanley
Kaplan observed in a 1972 article, Congress' refusal to allow
nonconsensual impairment of equity interests in Chapter XI, even
though it so permitted impairment of equity in Chapter X, was
likely a reflection of the fact that Chapter X featured vastly more
procedural safeguards, such as the appointment of a disinterested
trustee and extensive involvement by the SEC.184 But the draft
proposed legislation combining Chapters X and XI would have
done away with this important distinction, allowing nonconsensual
impairment of equity interests under a regime that also permitted
the debtor to remain in possession. It seems that, at least in the
subcommittee deliberation, this reality was simply overlooked.
Nonetheless, Senator DeConcini continued to express concern
for shareholders. He conceded that they retain their equity
interests in Chapter XI, but suggested that their most important
economic interest, the right to the debtor's unlimited upside
potential, may be impaired in the long term by the debtor's poor
management: "[C]ompanies in chapter XI obviously have financial
problems; and if the debtor remains in possession, then you are
still operating under that management hat may have caused it to
be in that situation."186 In such cases, he believed, it would be
unfair to leave the shareholder "with his only recourse being his
rights ... as a common . .. stockholder."1 8 6  He remarked, "It
disturbs me that the stockholders seem to be the last to be
considered, with the exception of the SEC oversight."187  The
Senator also cited the natural tendency for debtors to align with
"the banks and other creditors."188
In response, the testifying attorneys continued to advocate for a
flexible approach, in which the debtor remains in possession
unless the court determines that a trustee or examiner is needed
183 Id. (statement of John J. Jerome, attorney, Milbank, Tweed, Handley & McCloy).
184 Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, Affecting Rights to Equity Interests Under Chapter
X of the Bankruptcy Act, 1972 WiS. L. REV. 978, 984.
18 Hearings, supra note 176, at 585 (statement of Dennis DeConcini, Sen., Ariz.).
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 586.
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to protect any stakeholders, including equity holders.18 9 And,
acknowledging that shareholders need some representation, the
attorneys explained that in addition to the court's possible
formation of an official equity committee, the SEC might also
intervene to assist shareholders.190 As this and other similar
exchanges in the legislative history demonstrate, Congress was
sensitive to shareholder concerns and acknowledged their need for
formal representation, but felt it would be more appropriate to
allow multiple avenues of potential representation rather than a
one-size-fits-all approach that may prove inefficient in certain
cases. Hidden in the legislative history is an expectation that, in
the case of publicly-traded debtor companies, the SEC would be
more involved, such that mandatory official equity committees,
disinterested trustees, or both, would be potentially duplicative of
the agency's efforts.
Unfortunately, modern bankruptcy law and practice have not
lived up to these expectations. For the investing public, the SEC
continues to serve an essential role within and outside of
bankruptcy, advancing its mission "to protect investors; maintain
fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital
formation . .. to promote a market environment that is worthy of
the public's trust."19 1 But while Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code provides that the agency "may raise and may appear and be
heard on any issue in a case,"192 the SEC tends to concentrate its
limited resources on policy and enforcement activities beyond the
bankruptcy courts.193 In fact, in 1983, the agency made an official
decision to substantially diminish its involvement in bankruptcy
matters.194 An official statement explained,
189 Id. at 585-86 (statements of John J. Jerome, attorney, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &
McCloy; Patrick A. Murphy, attorney, Cowans & Murphy).
190 Id. at 589 (statement of Robert H. MacKinnon, attorney, Shearman & Sterling).
191 About the SEC, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml ( ast visited Feb. 9, 2017).
192 11 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012).
193 See, e.g., Alistaire Bambach, The SEC in Bankruptcy: Past and Present, 18 AM. BANIKR.
INST. L. REV. 607, 607 (2010) (referring to the SEC's "small group of dedicated bankruptcy
lawyers"); Alistaire Bambach & Samuel R. Maizel, The SEC's Role in Public Company
Bankruptcy Cases Where There is a Significant Enforcement Interest, 2005 ANN. SUtV.
BANKR. L. 3, 3 (describing the SEC's generally limited role in most bankruptcy cases).
194 See Request for Public Comments on the Role of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in Reorganization Cases Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Release No.
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The conclusion that the program should be
significantly curtailed was based in part on the belief
that the [SEC] could reduce its own resource
commitment in the reorganization area and rely on the
combined efforts of the . .. U.S. Trustees and of official
shareholder committees to protect the interests of the
investing public.195
For the most part, the agency has continued this trend and has not
often intervened in Chapter 11 cases on behalf of shareholders.196
With the SEC largely out of the picture, shareholders are more
reliant than ever on official equity committees. Unfortunately, a
jurisprudential shift in the last twenty years has made it
extremely difficult for shareholders to convince courts and U.S.
Trustees to exercise their discretion to appoint official equity
committees.197 The legal standard has shifted because the phrase
"adequate representation" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code,
leaving courts to assess multiple factors, such as the size and
complexity of the case and the debtor's financial condition.198
Reflecting an economic analysis of bankruptcy law, recent
decisions from the highly influential U.S. Bankruptcy Courts for
34-27300, 54 Fed. Reg. 40,760, 40,762 (Oct. 3, 1989) ("[The Commission should alter then
existing practices by curtailing its active participation in reorganization cases.").
195 Id.
196 It should be noted, however, that in those rare instances when the SEC does intervene on
behalf of shareholders, the agency is able to deliver powerful support. For instance, in October
2016, the SEC delivered written correspondence to the U.S. Trustee advocating the formation
of an official equity committee to represent shareholders of Breitburn Energy Partners LP.
Addendum to Second Supplemental Response to Certain Holders of Equity Securities to Order
to Show Cause Dated July 20, 2016 Why Appointment of Statutory Committee of Equity
Holders Should Not Be Ordered at 2, Ex. A, In re Breitburn Energy Partners LP, No. 16-11390
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2016). In its letter, the SEC addressed the common misconception
that shareholders do not need formal representation in Chapter 11 because they are already
represented by the debtor's management. The SEC explained: "equity-owning officers and
directors generally cannot adequately represent shareholders due to their conflicting fiduciary
duties to creditors in a bankruptcy and other possible conflicts of interest (i.e. management
incentive and retention plans)." Id. at Ex. A. At a hearing the following week, the bankruptcy
court ordered the appointment of an official equity committee. Jessica DiNapoli, U.S.
Bankruptcy Judge Approves Breitburn Stakeholders Committee, REUTERS (Oct. 14, 2016, 3:45
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/breitburn-energy-equity/rpt-u-s-bankruptcy-judge-approv
es-breitburn-stakeholders-committee-idUSL1NICKlMN.
197 Dick, supra note 7, at 18.
s Id. at 18-19.
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the District of Delaware and the Southern District of New York
emphasize the financial burden to the estate and discourage
formation of official equity committees when the debtor appears to
be "hopelessly insolvent."199  I
As previous sections explored, the narrow focus on the debtor's
solvency as the only way for shareholders to have an economic
interest in the case reflects bankruptcy law's disregard for
shareholders' most important economic interest-the right to the
debtor's unlimited upside potential after all creditor claims are
satisfied. To be sure, the economic uncertainties that drive
companies into bankruptcy-as well as the risks that accompany
most reorganization plans-also drive down the value of equity's
option right. In many cases, the benefits of an efficient
reorganization to all other stakeholders will far outweigh the
negligible value of the upside rights. But this standard fails to take
into account the unique incentives that may be present in bearish
bankruptcies. In these and other cases, U.S. Trustees and
bankruptcy judges across the country routinely ignore upside rights
and require that shareholders requesting an equity committee bear
the burden of establishing a "substantial likelihood" of the debtor's
solvency.200 In practical terms, this means that shareholders must
make a convincing valuation case simply to obtain a seat at the
negotiation table. And they are expected to do so by subjecting
evidence prepared by the debtor under conservative accounting
practices to prevailing corporate valuation techniques that fail to
fully capture the debtor's upside potential.
Moreover, shareholders face information asymmetries and
collective action challenges that make it even more difficult for
them to meet this evidentiary burden. These issues are
compounded by the fact that commercial debtors frequently delay
the release of audited financial statements during the pendency of
the bankruptcy case, and typically include broad legal disclaimers
in their financial disclosures to the bankruptcy court.201
199 See, e.g., In re Williams Commc'ns Grp., Inc., 281 B.R. 216, 220 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
200 See, e.g., In re Spansion, Inc., 421 B.R. 151, 156 (Dankr. D. Del. 2009). Courts and U.S.
Trustees frequently apply the standard set forth in Exide Technologies v. Wisconsin
Investment Board, No. 02-1572-SLR, 2002 WL 32332000, at *1 & n.2 (D. Del. Dec. 23, 2002),
and In re Williams Communication's Group, Inc., 281 B.R. at 223.
201 Dick, supra note 120, at 1500.
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Fortunately, the Horsehead court was sensitive to these concerns
when it granted Guy Spier's pro se bid for an official equity
committee. At the same time, though, Judge Sontchi
acknowledged that the weight of modern bankruptcy law was
against the shareholders: "I'm going, frankly, out on a limb here
from a standpoint of where the law puts me . . . ."202 Although all
bankruptcy judges have broad equitable powers,203 many have
been unwilling to use their discretion to grant similar requests for
official equity committees.204 And even when a court eventually
orders the appointment of an official equity committee, the
decision is usually made later in the case. Thus, shareholders may
arrive at the negotiation table just in time to discover that the
debtor has effectively promised away the upside rights that they
have been struggling to retain.
Finally, although the U.S. Trustee is theoretically available to
assist all stakeholders, the agency tends to be focused on creditor
interests and economic efficiency, reflecting its mission "to
promote the integrity and efficiency of the bankruptcy system for
the benefit of all stakeholders-debtors, creditors, and the
public."205 Under the Bankruptcy Code, the agency is charged
with monitoring the administration of bankruptcy cases and
taking action where appropriate to prevent undue delay.206
Evidencing its commitment to speed and efficiency, the U.S.
Trustee almost always aligns with debtors and creditors to oppose
attempts by shareholders to obtain official equity committees,
typically citing the costs to the estate of providing representation
to shareholders.207
202 Transcript of Hearing, supra note 11, at 100.
203 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012) ("The court may issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.").
204 See, e.g., In re SunEdison, Inc., 556 B.R. 94, 107 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (denying
request by shareholders to appoint an equity committee).
205 Strategic Plan & Mission, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ust/strategic-pl
an-mission (last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
206 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(G) (2012).
207 See, e.g., Statement of U.S. Trustee Regarding Emergency Motion to Appoint an
Official Committee of Equity Holders at 6-7, In re Sandridge Energy, Inc., No. 16-32488
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 25, 2016) (citing In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 407 B.R. 211, 216
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009) for the proposition that "the likely cost to Debtors' estates of an
equity committee" is one factor in determining whether to appoint an equity committee).
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All of this means that it can be extremely difficult for
shareholders to meaningfully participate in Chapter 11 proceedings.
To many modern observers, this is simply the way Chapter 11
functions; after all, state corporate laws provide that shareholders
are indirectly represented in the case by the debtor's management,
and shareholders are likely to be wiped out in Chapter 11. But in
actuality, the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code always assumed
shareholders would have some direct representation in bankruptcy,
whether in the form of an official equity committee, the SEC, or a
disinterested trustee-they did not expect shareholders to rely on
the debtor's management or on their own expensive and often futile
attempts to intervene on their own behalf. But, in their efforts to
blend the previous corporate reorganization chapters in a way that
would increase economic efficiency and promote flexibility, the
drafters made most procedural protections for shareholders merely
discretionary. Forty years later, with the bankruptcy courts, U.S.
Trustee, and the SEC already stretched thin, it appears that each
now looks to one or the other to guard the interests of shareholders.
And it certainly does not help matters that prevailing practice
ignores shareholders' most important economic interest. The
following Part examines how debtors and their dominant
stakeholders take advantage of these failures and seize valuable
upside rights in Chapter 11.
IV. THE BEARISH DEBTOR AND ITS POSTPETITION INVESTORS
In previous sections I argue that bearish bankruptcy
reorganizations present unique challenges and opportunities, and
that prevailing practice systematically underestimates the debtor's
value by failing to take into account the reorganized company's full
upside potential. In this Part, I argue that bearish debtors and
their senior creditors do not wait for plan confirmation to
redistribute valuable upside rights. Rather, they take immediate
steps to eliminate uncertainty and convert, early in the case,208
certain creditors' limited and fixed rights into unlimited upside
rights. There are a variety of devices and instruments that parties
208 Or, in the case of prepackaged plans, even before the bankruptcy petition is filed.
Prepackaged plans are permissible to the extent they are solicited in accordance with 11
U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1126(b).
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may use, including postpetition financing agreements and their
accompanying equity participation agreements and restructuring
support agreements. Taken together, these agreements effectively
lock in claims to upside rights. Yet courts show great deference to
debtors' decisions to pursue arrangements of this sort, likely
because of deep and longstanding judicial assumptions regarding
the nature of a debtor's relationship with its creditors generally
and with its postpetition lenders in particular. The following
section introduces some of the devices creditors use to secure the
upside rights and how courts have traditionally viewed them.
A. POSTPETITION FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS GENERALLY
Though under-studied in academic literature, postpetition
financing-including debtor-in-possession, bridge, and exit
financing-is a common feature of large Chapter 11 cases. This is
because it can take considerable time for a debtor to develop a
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization and negotiate to obtain the
support of major stakeholders. At the same time, the debtor must
continue to operate its business, maintain relationships with
customers and suppliers, cover payroll and satisfy working capital
requirements, make any necessary capital expenditures, and
manage the expenses associated with the restructuring. The
debtor's plan of reorganization may also depend on cash infusions
in order to make necessary improvements or expansions.
However, because all of its assets are typically leveraged at the
time of a bankruptcy filing, the debtor will require special
concessions-usually in the form of financing arrangements
authorized by the court during the pendency of the case-to meet
these liquidity needs.209
The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code sought to entice lenders to
extend credit to bankrupt companieS210 by including generous
209 In addition to obtaining postpetition financing, debtors also typically request and
receive permission to use cash collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (2012) (permitting the
court to authorize the use of cash collateral).
210 See 5 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAc. 3D § 94:33 (2017) ("The purpose of Code § 364 is to
induce creditors to extend credit after the commencement of the Chapter 11 case."); George
G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV.
901, 902 (1993) (recounting the persistent yet dubious claim that credit enhancements are
needed to induce lenders to enter into DIP financing arrangements).
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credit enhancements.211 For instance, postpetition lenders may
receive secured and/or superpriority administrative claim status,
giving their claims payment priority over all other obligations of
the debtor, including administrative expenses and priority
claims.212 Postpetition lenders also customarily ask for and receive
additional protections during the course of negotiations with the
debtor and during the court approval process.213 In this way, both
the statutory framework and customary practice focus on how to
balance the postpetition lender's need to manage credit risk on the
one hand, and the debtor's need to pursue a Chapter 11
restructuring that best advances the interests of all stakeholders
on the other.
These incentives clearly empower postpetition lenders. But
large commercial debtors also enjoy substantial influence. As
discussed in previous sections, bankruptcy law has long recognized
that debtors may use both pre and postpetition transactions to
transfer value to dominant stakeholders.214  But postpetition
financing arrangements are rarely subjected to such a high level of
scrutiny. In fact, they generally escape rigorous judicial
examination altogether, particularly in the jurisdictions most
likely to hear large commercial cases.215  This is due to a
fundamental assumption that collusion between debtors and their
postpetition lenders is unlikely because they come to the
bankruptcy negotiation table with opposing economic preferences,
focus their negotiations on a specific and temporary financial
accommodation, and remain antagonistic toward each other for the
duration of the case.216
While some commentators concede that postpetition financing
agreements tend to be overly generous toward lenders, these
concessions are blamed on differences in relative bargaining power
211 See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012) (authorizing a debtor in possession to incur postpetition
debt under certain circumstances). Practitioners frequently refer to these arrangements as
"debtor in possession financing" or "DIP financing."
212 Id. § 364(c).
21s See, e.g., Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. (In re Def. Drug
Stores, Inc.), 145 B.R. 312, 316 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992) ("Bankruptcy courts, however, have
regularly authorized postpetition financing arrangements containing lender incentives
beyond the explicit priorities and liens specified in section 364.").
214 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
215 See infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
216 See infra Section IV.c.
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and a legal milieu that is presently tilted too much in favor of
enticing postpetition lenders. This logic suggests that, but for the
debtor's weakened bargaining position, it would act on its economic
impulses and drive a much harder bargain with its postpetition
lenders. After all, the pursuit of financing is an exercise of the
debtor's business judgment217 made in accordance with its fiduciary
duty to maximize the value of the estate.218 Thus, if either party
ought to be checked, it is the lender. A permissive business
judgment standard is believed to provide a necessary offset: a lender
can only overreach so far before the diligent, value-maximizing
debtor will decide that the proposed financing arrangement would
do more harm than good to the estate.
But these theoretical checks and balances may not be enough,
especially in the case of bearish bankruptcies. It seems that the
true risk is not what an overbearing creditor might do to restrain a
weak and harried debtor, but rather what these two,
independently powerful forces combined might do to bypass
important safeguards and seize overlooked or vulnerable sources
of value, such as upside rights. The following subsections explore
these possibilities in more detail, focusing not only on postpetition
debt instruments, but also on the new equity issuances that
increasingly go along with them.
B. A CLOSER LOOK AT POSTPETITION FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS
Credit risk management is one of the most enduring concepts in
commercial finance.219 Considered a nearly universal best practice
among commercial lenders, the concept refers to the assessment
and integration of risks pertaining to the credit relationship,
217 See, e.g., A&K Endowment, Inc. v. Gen. Growth Props. Inc. (In re Gen. Growth Props.,
Inc.), 423 B.R. 716, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (recognizing postpetition financing as an exercise of
the debtors' prudent business judgment that has the potential to benefit the estate).
218 See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2012) (noting that a debtor in possession has the same duties as
a trustee); In re Washington Grp., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 246, 250 (M.D.N.C. 1979) (explaining
that a trustee's duty "is to act in the best interests of the Debtors' estate').
219 See generally, e.g., SYLVAIN BOUTEILL9 & DIANE COOGAN-PUSHNER, THE HANDBOOK OF
cREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT: ORIGINATING, ASSESSING, AND MANAGING CREDIT EXPOSURES




generally with a goal of preserving liquidity and profitability.2 20
Financial institutions and other investors that are considering
whether to lend to companies-including those in the midst of
Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization-are assumed to base their
decisions on these prevailing business standards and best
practices, just as they do with any other extensions of credit.221
Although debtors are permitted to obtain postpetition credit on
an unsecured basis as an administrative expense,222 most lenders
require additional assurance that an already distressed debtor will
repay the obligations. Reflecting this commercial reality, the law
in this area primarily serves to entice lenders to extend credit to
bankrupt companies and to assist them in managing the credit
risk.2 2 3 To this end, the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code expressly
authorized generous credit enhancements for postpetition
lenders.224 For instance, after notice and a hearing, the debtor
may request that the court grant the postpetition lender
administrative priority.225  Recognizing that administrative
priority may not be enough of an enhancement, Congress further
empowered bankruptcy courts to grant superpriority
administrative claim status, thereby privileging the postpetition
lender above all other priority and administrative claimants.226
When lenders demand collateral, courts are permitted to lift the
automatic stay in order to grant junior liens in already-
encumbered assets of the estate, or new liens in previously
220 See, e.g., BOUTEILLt & COOGAN-PUSHNER, supra note 219, at 18-19 (explaining the
importance of managing credit risk).
221 See, e.g., Sarah Woo, Borders' DIP Financing and Risk Weights, CREDIT SLIPS: A
DISCUSSION ON CREDIT, FINANCE, AND BANKRUPTCY (Feb. 23, 2011, 11:24 PM), http://www.cre
ditslips.org/creditslips/2011/O2/borders-dip-facility-and-risk-weights.html (demonstrating the
application of credit risk management principles to a DIP financing decision).
222 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(a), 503(b)(1) (2012) (permitting such arrangements).
223 See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
224 11 U.S.C. § 364.
226 Id. § 364(c).
226 For instance, a postpetition lender who is granted superpriority administrative claim
status would be granted administrative expense treatment under § 503(b)(1), taking
priority over claims of the kind specified under, or ordered pursuant to §§ 105, 326, 328,
330, 331, 503(b), 507(a), 364(c)(1), 546(c), 726 or 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code. In most
cases, however, the parties negotiate to allow carve-outs for certain expenses. See, e.g., In
re Molycorp, Inc., 562 B.R. 67, 76 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017) ("[P]rofessionals usually negotiate a
carve-out to provide for payment of their allowed fees.").
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unencumbered assets.227 Finally, when these accommodations are
still not enough to entice lenders, courts have the power to grant
so-called "priming liens" on the debtor's assets pursuant to Code
§ 364(d).228 With a priming lien, the postpetition lender essentially
moves to the front of the line, gaining a lien that is senior to all
existing liens on the collateral.229
Meanwhile, all commercial lenders-including postpetition
lenders-are safeguarded by customary representations,
warranties, and covenants in commercial loan documentation.2 30
With respect to postpetition lenders, even standard provisions take
on greater significance, as they are typically enforceable by the
case-ending remedy of terminating the loan agreement in the
event of a default. Increasingly, though, postpetition lenders also
ask for and receive a host of other protections, generally in the
form of additional, more onerous covenants in the postpetition
financing agreement. Postpetition lenders frequently request
releases or waivers of claims relating to prepetition
indebtedneSS231 and either cross-collateralization232 or "roll-up"2 3 3
of all or some of the prepetition debt owed to the postpetition
lender. Some lenders also demand advance waivers of the debtor's
most important rights (such as surcharge234 and avoidance
actions), as well as limitations on carve-outs for payment of estate
and committee professional fees. In an effort to gain "some
2 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(2)-(3).
228 MICHAEL L. COOK & DENNIS CONNOLLY, BANKR. LITIG. MANUAL § 18.01 (2016).
229 In order to grant such a lien on already-encumbered property, the debtor must show
that it cannot otherwise obtain such credit and that the interests of the existing lienholders
are adequately protected. 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1).
230 Standard commercial financing terms are described in MICHAEL BELLUCCI & JEROME
MCCLUSKEY, THE LSTA's COMPLETE CREDIT AGREEMENT GUIDE (2d ed. 2017), and
CAROLYN E.C. PARIS, DRAFTING FOR CORPORATE FINANCE: WHAT LAW SCHOOL DOESN'T
TEACH YOU (2007).
231 See, e.g., In re FCX, Inc., 54 B.R. 833, 837 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985).
232 For a description of cross-collateralization generally, see Otte v. Manufacturers
Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Texlon Corp.), 596 F.2d 1092, 1094 (2d Cir. 1979). For a
discussion of the enforceability of provisions of this sort, see, for example, In re Antico
Manufacturing Co., 31 B.R. 103, 105 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
233 To avoid the enforceability issues of cross-collateralization provisions, many
postpetition financing arrangements require that the debtor use some portion of the loan
proceeds to satisfy certain prepetition claims, thereby "rolling up" the claims into the new,
postpetition indebtedness. See Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co. (In re Saybrook Mfg. Co.), 963
F.2d 1490, 1491 (11th Cir. 1992).
234 The right to surcharge a lender is set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (2012).
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measure of control over [their] investment," lenders may demand
the right to appoint a CEO and/or additional members of the
debtor's board of directors.235  Others require that the debtor
consent to so-called "drop dead" relief from the automatic stay in
the event that the court confirms a plan over the lender's
objection.236 Increasingly, postpetition lenders require that the
debtor meet certain milestones in the case, based on a detailed
case timeline incorporated into the financing agreement or related
instruments.237 These milestones may include obtaining interim
and final court approval of the postpetition financing
arrangement, as well as more specific milestones pertaining to
asset sales or Chapter 11 plan negotiations and approval.238
Finally, modern postpetition financing agreements often contain
market and company material adverse change and material
adverse effect clauses, allowing the lender to avoid funding and
renegotiate terms when market or company conditions have
changed.239 For all of these reasons, postpetition lenders enjoy an
exceptionally strong bargaining position with respect to plan
negotiations.240
These generous protections and enhancements are typically
justified from a credit risk management perspective: they are the
law's response to the ostensibly logical question, "Who wants to
lend to bankrupt companies?"241 But a more holistic view of
235 In re Mid-State Raceway Inc., 323 B.R. 40, 62 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2005).
236 However, at least one bankruptcy court declined to approve a postpetition financing
arrangement hat included, inter alia, a provision of this sort. See In re Tenney Vill. Co.,
104 B.R. 562, 568 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989).
237 David A. Zdunkewicz, Recent Trends and Developments in DIP Financings, STOUT
RISIUS ROSS 2 (2014), https://www.andrewskurth.com/medialarticle/1716_ZdunkewiczSSR
JournalFall2014.pdf.
28 Id.
239 Material adverse change/effect clauses are discussed in a leading Delaware corporate
law case. In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001).
240 Professor David Skeel summarized the concerns thusly: "The DIP loan agreement has
become the single most important governance lever in many large Chapter 11 cases." David
A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 25 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1905, 1906 (2004); see also Robert K Rasmussen, Secured Credit, Control Rights
and Options, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1935, 1945 (2004) ("[T]he revolving credit facility lender
may use the debtor-in-possession financing to increase its control.").
241 For instance, the question has been suggested in the introduction to an article by a
leading commercial restructuring attorney, Marshall S. Huebner, Debtor-in-Possession
Financing, RMA J., Apr. 2005, at 30, and by the appraisal of the DIP lending relationship
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commercial financing suggests that the underlying business
decision to lend to a debtor is not so controversial.242 In fact, the
scales might presently be tilted too far in favor of postpetition
lenders. Indeed, empirical data reveals an extremely low default
risk for postpetition financing.243 And, even with the additional
perquisites offered under modern bankruptcy law, postpetition
lenders still enjoy pricing terms that would ordinarily apply to far
riskier investments. Postpetition lenders typically receive a
premium rate of interest along with generous fee payments.244
Postpetition lenders also traditionally benefit from certain
unique aspects of the bankruptcy lending environment, which
serve to limit competition. For example, companies in bankruptcy
may have limited access to capital markets and, due to the
traditional covenants in their prepetition loan documentation, may
face considerable transaction costs when they attempt to obtain
financing from other lenders.245 Similarly, agreements among the
debtor's prepetition lenders may restrict the debtor's access to
postpetition financing.246  These constraints further empower
postpetition lenders to demand high fees and interest rates at the
ultimate expense of the debtor's junior stakeholders.
Over the years, courts and commentators have acknowledged
that postpetition financing arrangements tend to be overly
by a bankruptcy court: "Creditors are often loathe to knowingly extend credit to entities in
reorganization." In re Glover, Inc., 43 B.R. 322, 324 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1984).
242 Huebner, supra note 241, at 30 ("As it turns out, lending to a debtor in possession can
be a smart move."); see also Peter Antoszyk, New Developments in Dip Lending and Cash
Collateral: Trends in Debtor in Possession Financing, AM. BANKR. INST., ABI WINTER
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, Nov. 29-Dec. 1, 2001 ("[L]enders have come to realize that 'DIP
financing' can be quite lucrative.").
243 See, e.g., Moody's Comments on Debtor-in-Possession Lending, MOODY'S GLOBAL
CORPORATE FINANCE, Oct. 2008, at 4 (noting that of the 297 cases analyzed, "only 2 DIP
facilities experienced defaults").
244 In one especially egregious example, the court found that the interest and fees in a
postpetition financing arrangement amounted to an interest rate in excess of one hundred
percent. In re The Colad Grp., Inc., 324 B.R. 208, 220 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005).
245 One empirical study refers to these costs as "switching costs," which result from the lock-
in effects of prior lending relationships. Iftekhar Hasan, Gabriel G. Ramirez & Gaiyan Zhang,
Lock-In Effects in Relationship Lending: Evidence from DIP Loans 8-9 (2012), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1785686.
246 See Mark N. Berman & David Lee, The Enforceability in Bankruptcy Proceedings of
Waiver and Assignment of Rights Clauses Within Intercreditor or Subordination
Agreements, 20 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 6 Art. 1 (2011) (noting that intercreditor
agreements may limit the ancillary right to offer debtor in possession financing).
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generous toward lenders, giving them far too much control over
the case.24 7 But these inequities and inefficiencies are believed to
be caused by either preexisting differences in relative bargaining
power, a legal framework that has gone too far in its efforts to
attract and protect lenders, or both. For instance, in their
attempts to isolate the causes of the imbalance, some analysts
have focused on the varying degrees of bargaining power possessed
by traditional bank lenders, on the one hand, and hedge funds and
other distressed debt investors, on the other.248  Other
commentators have contrasted financing arrangements extended
by new postpetition lenders with those offered by the debtor's
prepetition creditors.249  The Ninth Circuit summarized the
prevailing view thusly: "Debtors in possession generally enjoy
little negotiating power with a proposed lender, particularly when
the lender has a prepetition lien on cash collateral. As a result,
lenders often exact favorable terms that harm the estate and
creditors."250 But for these dynamics, bankruptcy law assumes
that the debtor will act on its strong economic impulses to drive a
much harder bargain.2
51
247 The observation is eloquently made in Robin Phelan & Ocean Tama, The Use of DIP
Financing as a Mechanism to Control the US Corporate Restructuring Process, N. AM.
REGIONAL F. NEWS (Int'l Bar Ass'n Legal Practice Div., London, U.K.), Oct. 2010, at 24
("Lenders routinely use debtor-in-possession financing ... agreements to gain substantial
control over debtors in Chapter 11 and the bankruptcy reorganisation process.").
248 See Wei Jiang, Kai Li & Wei Wang, Hedge Funds and Chapter 11, 67 J. FIN. 513, 516
(2012) (noting that "unlike traditional creditors (such as banks and insurance companies)
that strive to contain damages on their existing investment at the bankruptcy bargaining
table, hedge funds seek out distressed claims for profitable investment" and "are better able
to hold highly concentrated, illiquid positions that strengthen their influence at the
negotiation table").
249 See, e.g., Richard M. Kohn, Alan P. Solow & Douglas P. Taber, Pure Debtor-in-
Possession Financing, 51 THE SECURED LENDER, Nov./Dec. 1995, at 6 (arguing that "lenders
[who] seek out opportunities to extend debtor-in-possession financing to companies in
Chapter 11 with whom they have no prepetition lending relationship" have "much more
leverage than a typical lender whose borrower has filed for bankruptcy"); see also
Zdunkewicz, supra note 237, at 1-2 (distinguishing between "defensive" DIP financings
provided by prepetition lenders and "offensive" DIP financings provided by new lenders who
are seeking to gain control of the company).
250 Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. (In re Def. Drug Stores,
Inc.), 145 B.R. 312, 317 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992).
251 See In re Ion Media Networks, Inc., No. 09-13125JMP, 2009 WL 2902568, at *4 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2009) (finding that although debtors are "naturally motivated to obtain
financing on the best possible terms," in the bankruptcy setting it is particularly true that
484
THE BEARISH BANKRUPTCY
In response, the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code instituted
several checks on potential lender overreach. But, reflecting the
basic assumption that debtors are at odds with their creditors,
these statutory checks turn on a permissive business judgment
standard that is deemed to be satisfied when the debtor meets its
requisite burden of proof.25 2  The debtor's burden of proof is
generally considered to be satisfied through the debtor's
declarations and disclosures to the court that the financing was
negotiated in good faith and at arm's length, and that it is to be
extended for valid business purposes and in good faith.253 For
instance, the debtor must convince the court-generally through
its own declarations-that the terms and conditions of the
postpetition financing arrangement, including any fees paid
thereunder, are fair, reasonable, and the best available under the
circumstances, that they reflect the debtor's exercise of prudent
business judgment consistent with its fiduciary duties, and that
they are supported by reasonably equivalent value and fair
consideration.2 5 4  With respect to the granting of secured or
superpriority claim status, the debtor must demonstrate "by a
good faith effort that credit was not available" on an unsecured or
administrative expense basis,255 and, in the case of priming liens,
that the existing lienholders are adequately protected.256
However, the debtor need not actually "seek credit from every
possible lender before concluding that such credit is
unavailable."257 In deciding whether to approve the proposed
"cooperation and establishing alliances with creditor groups" by the debtor "may be preferable
to a notionally better transaction that carries the risk of promoting unwanted conflict).
252 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(2) (2012); see also In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 38
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (recognizing that "debtors-in-possession generally enjoy little
negotiating power with a proposed lender," yet "[a]t the same time ... permit[ting] debtors-in-
possession to exercise their basic business judgment consistent with their fiduciary duties').
253 The term "good faith" is used in 11 U.S.C. § 364(e). These and related factors are
summarized in Ames Dep't Stores, 115 B.R. at 37-39, and Bland v. Farmworker Creditors,
308 B.R. 109, 113-14 (S.D. Ga. 2003).
254 Bland, 308 B.R. at 113-14.
255 Bray v. Shenandoah Fed. Says. & Loan Ass'n (In re Snowshoe Co.), 789 F.2d 1085 (4th
Cir. 1986); see also 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1)(A).
256 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1)(B)-(d)(2).
257 Bray, 789 F.2d at 1088; see also Ames Dep't Stores, 115 B.R. at 40 (holding that
approaching four prospective postpetition lenders was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
§ 364(c)); In re Sky Valley, Inc., 100 B.R. 107, 113 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) (acknowledging that
in an already tight postpetition lending market, "it would be unrealistic and unnecessary to
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financing arrangement, the court is permitted to take into
consideration non-economic benefits to the debtor, such that a
mere market comparison of credit terms is not determinative.258
Although some bankruptcy courts conduct their own examination
of proposed financing arrangements,259 the courts most likely to
hear large commercial bankruptcy cases-Delaware and the
Southern District of New York-do not typically engage in these
independent examinations. Rather, as with most other key
decisions made by companies in bankruptcy, these and many other
bankruptcy courts largely defer to the debtor's own business
judgment unless the court believes that circumstances are
egregious.260 This is because, as one court explained, the debtor's
right to operate its business includes "the concomitant discretion to
exercise reasonable business judgment in ordinary business
matters," including the decision to obtain financing.261 Courts avoid
second-guessing the debtor's business decisions, including decisions
regarding postpetition financing where, considering all facts and
circumstances, the evidence shows that the relevant decisions were
based on reasonable grounds and reasonably reflect business
require [debtors] to conduct ... an exhaustive search for financing"), affd sub nom. Anchor
Say. Bank Fank FSB v. Sky Valley, Inc., 99 B.R. 117, 120 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
258 See, e.g., In re ION Media Networks, Inc., No. 09-13125JMP, 2009 WL 2902568, at *4
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2009) ("Relevant features of the financing must be evaluated,
including non-economic elements such as the timing and certainty of closing, the impact on
creditor constituencies and the likelihood of a successful reorganization.").
259 See, e.g., In re Tenney Vill. Co., 104 B.R. 562, 567-68 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989) (finding the
creditors' rights relative to the debtor "striking" and "shocking" upon independent
examination of the financing arrangements); In re Chevy Devco, 78 B.R. 585, 588-90
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) (demonstrating an exercise of the court's broad equitable powers to
evaluate the impact of the proposed postpetition financing on all stakeholders).
260 See In re Barbara K. Enters., Inc., No. 08-11474, 2008 WL 2439649, at *14 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2008) ("The Court is aware that its normal function in reviewing requests
for post-petition financing is to defer to a debtor's own business judgment so long as a
request for financing does not 'leverage the bankruptcy process' and unfairly cede control of
the reorganization to one party in interest" (citing In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 115 B.R.
34, 40 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990))); In re Farmland Indus., Inc., 294 B.R. 855, 881 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 2003) ("[T]he applicable factors can be synthesized as follows ... [t]hat the proposed
financing is an exercise of sound and reasonable business judgment .... ).
261 In re Simasko Prod. Co., 47 B.R. 444, 449 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) ("In exercising [the
debtor's] business judgment of conducting its drilling operations, it has found it necessary to




judgments made in good faith.262 For instance, courts have found
that this standard is met where the record demonstrates that the
parties negotiated and reflected their compromises in revised drafts
of the lender's proposed financing agreement.263
In essence, the law governing postpetition financing presumes
that debtors and their postpetition lenders have sufficiently adverse
interests. So long as the debtor can show that they bargained at
arm's length and engaged in a healthy dose of give-and-take, the
agreements they reach will be treated as objective evidence of what
is fair, reasonable, and the best available to the debtor under the
circumstances. As the following subsection explores, the
assumption that debtors and postpetition lenders are always
adverse to each other has made it difficult for more comprehensive
and protective judicial doctrines, such as the sub rosa plan doctrine,
to be applied to postpetition financing arrangements.
C. THE SUB ROSA PLAN DOCTRINE
As Judge Sontchi explained in Horsehead, debtors are not
required to auction themselves to the highest bidder.264
Nonetheless, Chapter 11 debtors increasingly choose to pursue
major corporate sale transactions under § 363 of the Bankruptcy
Code-a provision that authorizes the debtor in possession or a
trustee to sell all or part of the property of the estate.265 As § 363
asset sales have become more commonplace,266 some courts and
commentators have cautioned that although debtors have broad
discretion to conduct sales, they should not be permitted to abuse
the sale process and essentially engage in a Chapter 11
262 See, e.g., In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., No. 1-90-00130, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 472, at
*8-11 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 15, 1990) (finding that the debtor had exercised "reasonable
business judgment" by evaluating the need for the postpetition financing contemplated by
the draft agreements, considering other alternatives, and ultimately concluding "that the
[c]redit [a]greement represent[ed] the most prudent use of the assets and properties of the
estates of the Debtors and the pursuit of reorganization pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code").
263 See, e.g., In re W. Pac. Airlines, Inc., 223 B.R. 567, 572-73 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997)
(concluding that the debtor in possession had exercised reasonable business judgment
because the terms of the financing were negotiated at arm's length and the negotiations had
yielded important revisions to the original proposal).
26 Transcript of Ruling on Confirmation Hearing, supra note 35, at 9.
265 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012).
266 The increasing use of § 363 is famously addressed in Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 787 (2002).
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reorganization without going through the more arduous process of
drafting and negotiating a plan, soliciting votes, and obtaining
court approval by satisfying the requisite statutory safeguards.
The Fifth Circuit introduced the concept of a sub rosa ("below
the line") plan of reorganization in the 1983 case, In re Braniff
Airways, Inc.2 6 7 Assessing a § 363 sale, the court explained, "[t]he
debtor and the Bankruptcy Court should not be able to short
circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for confirmation of a
reorganization plan by establishing the terms of the plan sub rosa
in connection with a sale of assets."268 According to the Fifth
Circuit, a transaction amounts to a sub rosa plan if it: (1) specifies
the terms of any future reorganization plan; (2) restructures
creditors' rights; and (3) requires that all parties release claims
against the debtor, its officers and directors, and its secured
creditors.269
Soon after, a 1987 case, In re Chevy Devco,2 7 0 evidenced at least
one court's willingness to apply the sub rosa plan doctrine to
postpetition financing arrangements. In a published opinion that
primarily stands for the notion that adequate protection requires
something more than a speculative promise of future value, the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California
acknowledged that a postpetition financing arrangement can be
the equivalent of a plan.271
Indeed, the debtor itself stipulated that the proposed financing
was "equivalent to its plan of reorganization," admitting that it
deliberately chose to circumvent plan confirmation requirements
and use the more flexible tools afforded under § 364 of the
Bankruptcy Code.2 7 2 This is because the latter permitted the debtor
to subordinate the prepetition senior secured lender's lien, while the
former prohibited such a result.2 7 3 In an effort to prevent the debtor
267 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700
F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983).
268 Id. at 940.
269 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Cajun Elec. Power Coop. (In re Cajun Elec.
Power Coop.), 119 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d
935, 940) (5th Cir. 1983).
270 78 B.R. 585 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987).
271 Id. at 589-90.




from sidestepping important statutory protections, the court used
its equitable powers to treat the proposed financing arrangement
like a cramdown, holding it to Chapter 11 plan confirmation
requirements.274 The court articulated the test as follows: "Is a
senior lienor being given less than full protection so that a junior
creditor or interest can benefit from it? If so, this subordination
should not be allowed."2 75  Because the court found that the
proposed postpetition financing arrangement declined to provide the
prepetition senior secured lender adequate protection, the
arrangement failed the cramdown standard.276
Of course, Chevy Devco is primarily a case about adequate
protection, and thus it is not an especially strong doctrinal
precedent for applying the sub rosa plan doctrine to postpetition
financing arrangements more broadly and for the benefit of other
stakeholders. The test of time has proven this. Today, while the
sub rosa plan doctrine is regularly applied to § 363 sales-both
within and beyond the Fifth Circuit277-it has not gained similar
traction with respect to postpetition financing arrangements. This
is due in large part to the assumption that an inherent dualism
between lenders and debtors who are negotiating a new debt
instrument makes such coordinated feats unlikely.
One notable recent exception is the 2009 case, In re Belk
Properties, LLC, 2 78 decided by the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi. In Belk Properties, the
debtor-a real estate developer struggling to complete a highly
leveraged, multi-phase project during an economic recession-
sought to obtain an order from the court authorizing it to enter
into a postpetition financing arrangement with a distressed
investor, Meadowbrook Capital, LLC (Meadowbrook).279  The
proposed financing arrangement not only granted Meadowbrook a
priming, superpriority lien in the debtor's assets, but it also gave
274 Id. at 589-90.
275 Id. at 589.
276 Id. at 589-90.
277 See Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating
LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 466-67 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying the sub rosa plan doctrine and holding
a settlement was not an impermissible sub rosa plan); In re Capmark Fin. Grp., Inc., 438
B.R. 471, 513-14 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (same).
278 421 B.R. 221 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2009).
279 Id. at 222.
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Meadowbrook immediate control over the project.280 Moreover,
upon funding the loan, Meadowbrook would receive a controlling
51% equity position in the debtor, with additional equity
conversion rights that, if exercised, would allow Meadowbrook to
own up to 90% of the equity.281 Finally, the proposed agreement
prohibited the debtor from using loan proceeds for any purpose
other than payment of approved budgetary expenditures.2 8 2
In its decision denying the debtor's motion, the court identified
several problems with the proposed financing arrangement. For
one thing, the court criticized the .debtor for failing to provide
adequate protection to its prepetition secured lenders.283 Moreover,
the court complained that "Meadowbrook, as the lender, would
become the majority owner and the responsible party for the
debtor."2 84 The court noted the obvious conflicts of interest and
explained that the arrangement would essentially cloak
Meadowbrook "with the rights of a debtor-in-possession ... without
having been duly appointed through the procedures of § 1104(a)."28 5
Although these two technical concerns appear to have heavily
influenced the court's final decision, the balance of the court's
published opinion focused on a more theoretical issue: that the
proposed postpetition financing arrangement constituted a sub rosa
plan.286
Citing Braniff, the Belk Properties court was quick to
acknowledge that the case before it did not involve a § 363 sale.2 8 7
Nonetheless, it identified a number of factors that caused it to
conclude that "[i]n effect, the financing proposal is a clever way for
the lender to gain control of the debtor's assets without going
through the processes of a § 363(b) sale."2 88 First, the lender "would
effectively become the debtor," serving not only as the largest
secured creditor, but also as the manager and majority equity
280 Id.
281 Id. at 223.
282 Id. at 224.
283 Id. at 225.
284 Id. at 226.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 225-26.
287 Id. at 225.
288 Id.
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owner.289 Moreover, the court noted that the proposed financing
arrangement would bind the debtor to pursue a plan of
reorganization "consistent with the Term Sheet," and that it 'loosely
dictate [d] the manner in which existing creditors ... [would] be
treated."290 Thus, the court explained that if the financing order
was approved, "the plan of reorganization [would be] a fait accompli,
that is, . . . an accomplished fact for all practical purposes."291 For
these reasons, the court concluded that "the Meadowbrook post-
petition financing proposal ... violates the holding of Braniff
because it achieves the same effect as a sub rosa Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization."292
Although Belk Properties captured the immediate attention of
practitioners as a sign that courts might begin to apply heightened
scrutiny to postpetition financing arrangements,293 the decision
has had little impact on broader bankruptcy law and practice.
Indeed, at the time of this writing, it has not been cited or
discussed in a published court decision although it makes regular
appearances in briefs written by parties objecting to proposed
postpetition financing arrangements.294 Courts are apparently
persuaded by arguments that the holding applies only to
postpetition financing arrangements that give the lender a
controlling equity interest prior to plan confirmation.295 As a
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 226.
292 Id.
293 See, e.g., Leon R. Barson & Michael J. Custer, DIP Lending Facility Tantamount to
Impermissible Sub Rosa Plan, 6 SECURED CREDIT: AN ABI COMMITTEE NEWSL. No. 1, Mar.
2010 (noting that the Belk Properties decision "highlights the need for debtors and potential
DIP lenders to carefully evaluate whether financing terms may. . . give rise to a colorable
argument that a lending facility seeks to impermissibly bypass the statutory requirements
pertaining to the plan confirmation process"); Lorie R. Beers et al., Bankruptcy
Transformed: Are Reorganizations a Thing of the Past?, AM. BANKR. INST. 171, Apr. 29, 2010
(citing Belk Properties as a case demonstrating that "[riecent decisional aw confirms that
the Chapter 11 process is fundamentally changing').
294 See, e.g., Gasrock Capital LLC's Objection to Motion to Approve Debtor-in-Possession
Secured Financing from Linc Energy Petroleum (Wyoming), Inc. at 3, In re Rancher Energy
Corp., No. 09-32943 (Bankr. D. Colo. Jan. 3, 2011) ("This case presents facts analogous to In
re Belk Props., LLC, where the debtor had proposed post-petition financing through its
secured lender to achieve the same effect as a sub rosa Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.").
295 See, e.g., Debtors' Omnibus Reply to Objections to Second Lien DIP Motion at 21, In re
Energy Future Holdings Corp., No. 14-10979 (Bankr. D. Del. June 27, 2014) ('The key
distinction is that, in Belk, the debtors were seeking court approval of an equity issuance to
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debtor recently explained in defense of a more typical loan
structure, "[t]he Equity Conversion feature ... if exercised, will be
part of a plan that will be subject to all applicable confirmation
requirements and to which all parties will have a right to object or
otherwise contest valuation."296  Moreover, the same debtor
clarified that typical equity conversion features merely "set[] a
floor and a path to confirmation," which the debtor has "full
fiduciary flexibility to take or not."2 9 7 Provided the value of the
company increases prior to plan confirmation, the debtor can
arguably avoid the equity conversion altogether by refinancing or
repaying the postpetition loan.2 98
In addition to Chevy Deuco and Belk Properties, other published
opinions demonstrate how courts have grappled with the
occasional need for higher judicial scrutiny of postpetition
financing agreements. For instance, the U.S. Bankruptcy Panel of
the Ninth Circuit explained in In re Defender Drug Stores, Inc.,
that there are other circumstances where courts ought not to rely
on the permissive business judgment standard:
While certain favorable terms may be permitted as a
reasonable exercise of the debtor's business judgment,
bankruptcy courts do not allow terms in financing
arrangements that convert the bankruptcy process from
one designed to benefit all creditors to one designed for
the unwarranted benefit of the postpetition lender.
Thus, courts look to whether the proposed terms would
prejudice the powers and rights that the Code confers
a DIP lender before confirmation including the installation of the lender as the Debtors'
manager."); Omnibus Response to Objections to Debtors' Motion Pursuant to Sections 105,
361, 362, 364, 365, 502, 1107 and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code for Order (I) Authorizing
Debtors to Obtain Post-Petition Financing, (II) Granting Liens and Providing Super-
Priority Administrative Expense Status, (III) Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition
Secured Parties, (IV) Authorizing Debtors to Assume Connection Agreements with Delta
Air Lines, Inc., and (V) Allowing General Unsecured Claim at 14, In re Pinnacle Airlines
Corp., No. 12-11343 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2012) [hereinafter Debtors' Omnibus Reply]
(distinguishing Belk Properties on the grounds that it involved a financing arrangement
that "threatened to relegate fully secured creditors to undersecured positions, granted the
lender a 51% equity interest in the debtor and dictated the manner in which existing
creditors would be treated").
296 Debtors' Omnibus Reply, supra note 295, at 21.
297 Id. at 4.
298 Id. at 21.
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for the benefit of all creditors and leverage the Chapter
11 process by granting the lender excessive control over
the debtor or its assets as to unduly prejudice the rights
of other parties in interest.299
The court concluded that the subject postpetition financing
arrangement was not a sub rosa plan, and that nothing about the
proposed terms would enable the lender "to control the actions of
the debtor nor prevent other parties from exercising their rights."300
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire
conducted a similar analysis, finding that a postpetition financing
arrangement essentially transferred the economic value of the
estate and control over the debtor's business to the lender, in
violation of the debtor's fiduciary obligations.301  The court
explained that the proposed financing agreement would effectively
"disarm the [d]ebtor of all weapons usable against [the lender] for
the bankruptcy estate's benefit, place the [d]ebtor in bondage
working for [the lender], seize control of the reins of reorganization,
and steal a march on other creditors in numerous ways."302
As objecting parties from a myriad of recent Chapter 11 cases
have discovered, this narrow body of jurisprudence does not do
much to bolster arguments against more typical forms of
postpetition financing. This is because, taken together, these cases
stand only for the proposition that heightened judicial scrutiny is
necessary when the postpetition lender effectively becomes the
debtor, either because it accepts a majority equity stake or
managerial position during the pendency of the case (as in Belk
Properties), or because it assumes "excessive control over the debtor
or its assets" (as the Defender Drug Stores court cautioned).3 0 3 In
either event, the collapsing of the debtor and postpetition lender
into essentially one party removes the natural tendency for
adversarial relations, as well as any semblance of arm's length
negotiations. As the highly influential U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York explained, excessive control
299 Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. (In re Def. Drug Stores,
Inc.), 145 B.R. 312, 317 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992).
3 Id. at 318.
301 In re Tenney Vill. Co., 104 B.R. 562, 568-69 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989).
3 Id. at 568.
303 145 B.R. at 317.
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threatens the smooth functioning of the bankruptcy laws by
"skew[ing] the carefully designed balance of debtor and creditor
protections that Congress drew in crafting Chapter 11."304 Because
most forms of postpetition financing agreements do not contemplate
an immediate transfer of equity, parties are left to litigate whether
certain provisions amount to excessive control. Given that most
forms provide fiduciary and other "outs" for the parties, these
arguments have been difficult to sustain.
In essence, the limited body of jurisprudence applying the sub
rosa plan doctrine to postpetition financing arrangements does not
actually challenge the underlying assumption that debtors are
naturally adverse to their creditors; rather, these precedents
merely provide a narrow doctrinal alternative for those exceptional
cases where a creditor and debtor clearly become alter egos of each
other. The following section considers the unique role postpetition
financing arrangements play in bearish bankruptcies, particularly
when they are accompanied by equity conversion features or
exclusive rights offerings.
D. THE ROLE OF POSTPETITION FINANCING IN BEARISH
BANKRUPTCIES: HORSEHEAD REVISITED
For the reasons described above, postpetition financing
arrangements in all Chapter 11 cases are capable of shifting or
reinforcing the balance of power among the parties and foreclosing
other restructuring outcomes that may better advance the
interests of stakeholders. But in bearish bankruptcies, the risks
are even greater. This is because the lack of meaningful
substantive and procedural protections for shareholders effectively
strips the rights to the debtor's unlimited upside away from equity
owners, leaving them to be reallocated in the bankruptcy
proceedings. But debtors and their dominant creditors do not wait
for the regular plan confirmation process; rather, they use
postpetition financing arrangements and related instruments to
lock in claims to the debtor's full upside potential.
Consider, for instance, the postpetition financing agreement
and related instruments entered into in Horsehead. On the same
day that it filed for bankruptcy protection, Horsehead Holding also
304 In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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filed a motion seeking the court's permission to enter into a $90
million senior secured superpriority debtor-in-possession financing
agreement.305 The proposed postpetition lenders were a group of
prepetition creditors holding more than 80% of the company's
outstanding senior secured notes.306  The court approved the
postpetition financing on an interim,307 and later final,308 basis,
allowing the debtor immediate access to the requested financing
and also obligating it to comply with the agreement's aggressive
milestones and other onerous provisions. For instance, the initial
agreement provided that within forty days of the petition date, the
debtor must file a draft plan of reorganization that is acceptable to
the postpetition lenders and its other senior secured lenders.309
Although this and other milestones were extended several times
during the case, the unsecured creditors committee complained
that the tight timelines made it extremely difficult for other
parties to conduct the necessary diligence and properly vet the
debtor's disclosures and proposals.310
Working quickly to comply with the milestones, the debtor
proposed a draft plan that would extinguish existing equity and
eliminate substantially all of the company's debt by converting
approximately $205 million of its senior secured debt into equity in
the reorganized company, repaying certain other obligations in
full, and distributing cash, equity, and warrants to other
creditors.311  The debtor also proposed a Unit Purchase and
s05 See generally Debtors' Motion for Interim and Final Orders (1) Authorizing the Debtors to
Obtain Postpetition Secured Financing Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 362, 363, and 364, (II)
Authorizing the Postpetition Use of Cash Collateral, (III) Granting Adequate Protection to the
Prepetition Secured Parties, (IV) Scheduling a Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule
4001(b), and (V) Granting Related Relief, In re Horsehead Holding Corp., No. 16-10287
(Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 2, 2016).
306 Id. at 2.
30 See generally Interim Order, supra note 50.
30 See generally Final Order (A) Authoring the Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Secured
Financing Pursuant to Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code, (B) Authorizing the Debtors to
Use Cash Collateral, (C) Granting Adequate Protection to the Prepetition Secured Parties,
(D) Scheduling a Final Hearing, and (E) Granting Related Relief, In re Horsehead Holding
Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 3, 2016).
3o9 Interim Order, supra note 50, at 46.
o10 See Motion of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Extend Milestone
Deadlines Established in Final DIP Financing Order at 2, 4, In re Horsehead Holding Corp.,
No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 29, 2016).
-11 Debtors' Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization, supra note 24, at 18-22, 25-26.
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Support Agreement (the UPA). This agreement reflected mutual
promises between the debtor and its senior creditors to provide the
reorganized company access to exit financing up to $260 million, 312
of which approximately $100 million would be used to revive the
idled plant.313 However, this capital commitment would not take
the form of debt; rather, it would be a new equity issuance by the
reorganized debtor to certain of the postpetition and other senior
secured lenders.314 Containing many of the same provisions that
normally appear in postpetition loan documents-such as case
milestones and termination rights-the UPA also provided that,
subject to a limited obligation to entertain proposals brought by
other interested parties to the bankruptcy case, the debtor would
''cease any ongoing solicitations and negotiations with any person
with respect to any Alternative Transaction," and would "not
directly solicit any inquiries or the making of any proposal or offer
relating to an Alternative Transaction, participate in any
discussions or negotiations, or provide any non-public information
to any person with respect to an Alternative Transaction."315 In
the event that the debtor exercised its limited fiduciary out and
agreed to enter into an alternative transaction, then the debtor
would be obligated to pay a $7.5 million termination fee to its
counterparties under the UPA. 3 1 6 The .Official Committee of
Equity Security Holders objected to the proposed agreement on the
grounds that, among other things, the termination fee was in
312 See Debtors' Motion for Entry of an Order (I) Approving the Unit Purchase and
Support Agreement and Authorizing the Debtors to Honor Their Obligations Thereunder,
and (II) Granting Related Relief at 2, In re Horsehead Holding Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr.
D. Del. Aug. 9, 2016) [hereinafter Debtors' Motion for Entry of an Order] (discussing how
the $160 million Emergency Equity Purchase and the $100 million Additional Capital
Commitment in the UPA will work together to help the debtor refinance and reorganize).
The UPA was the product of earlier negotiations, as a draft of the agreement was previously
disclosed in the Debtors' Second Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 20, at Ex. F.
313 Reply in Support of Debtors' Motion for Entry of an Order (I) Approving the Unit
Purchase and Support Agreement and Authorizing the Debtors to Honor Their Obligations
Thereunder, and (II) Granting Related Relief at 2, In re Horsehead Holding Corp., No. 16-
10287 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 26, 2016).
314 Debtors' Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization, supra note 24, at 20
(discussing how senior secured noteholders will receive "New Common Equity" as a part of
the Additional Capital Commitment plan).
315 Debtors' Motion for Entry of an Order, supra note 312, at 6.
316 Id. at 11.
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"conflict with the debtor's duty to maximize the value of the
bankruptcy estate."317
But the court approved the debtor's entry into the UPA318 based
on the same permissive business judgment standard that governs
other forms of postpetition financing. Of course, as an equity
issuance rather than a debt issuance, the transaction was a § 363
"use ... other than in the ordinary course of business, [of the]
property of the estate."319 But the court did not consider the
possibility that the agreement-alone or in conjunction with other
agreements-might be a sub rosa plan. Rather, the debtor enjoyed
the benefit of the business judgment rule and was only required to
"show a sound business purpose" justified the proposed use of the
property,320 meaning it was reasonable rather than arbitrary or
capricious.321 The debtor emphasized the importance of raising
capital to the plan's ultimate success and reiterated that it was
naturally adverse to the creditors who were agreeing to invest in
the reorganized company: "[t]he Debtors and their advisors
engaged in substantial, arm's length negotiations in good faith
with the Plan Sponsors, all of whom are sophisticated parties who
have retained counsel and financial advisors, to arrive at the
terms of the UPA." 3 2 2
As explained above, the capital commitments contemplated
under the UPA ultimately became the linchpin for the company's
existing shareholders. Although the court momentarily
acknowledged that the company may be solvent, it found that
shareholders had failed to overcome this additional valuation
hurdle.323  Accordingly, Horsehead demonstrates how bearish
debtors and their postpetition lenders may use postpetition
317 Objection of Official Committee of Equity Security Holders to Debtors' Motion to
Approve the Unit Purchase and Support Agreement at 4-5, In re Horsehead Holding Corp.,
No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 23, 2016).
31 Order (I) Approving the Unit Purchase and Support Agreement and Authorizing the
Debtors to Honor Their Obligations Thereunder, and (II) Granting Related Relief at 2, In re
Horsehead Holding Corp., No. 16-10287 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 9, 2016).
319 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2012).
320 Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd. v. Montgomery Ward Holding Corp. (In re Montgomery
Ward Holding Corp.), 242 B.R. 147, 153 (D. Del. 1999).
321 Comm. of Asbestos-Related Litigants and/or Creditors v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re
Johns-Manville Corp.), 60 B.R. 612, 616 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
322 Debtors' Motion for Entry of an Order, supra note 312, at 10.
323 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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financing arrangements and related instruments to place the
debtor on a path that requires it to pursue a series of mutually
interdependent debt and equity issuances. In this way, these
agreements should be understood to form a single, integrated
restructuring transaction. For their part, postpetition lenders
have the power, under state law and the Bankruptcy Code, to
effectively lock up the estate during the pendency of the case,
albeit without the fiduciary responsibilities that a debtor has to
maximize value for the benefit of other stakeholders.32 4
Meanwhile, the debtor promises to focus its efforts on developing
and gaining confirmation of a plan that is acceptable to these
creditors. To this end, the debtor agrees to curtail plan
negotiations and resist meaningful consideration of alternative
proposals. Although most modern agreements give the parties
fiduciary outs, these instruments in substance strongly incentivize
continued pursuit of the plan. Far from serving as checks on each
other, debtors and their postpetition lenders at times basically
team up to make the powers afforded to them under the
Bankruptcy Code absolute.
For instance, under prevailing practice, bearish debtors and
their dominant stakeholders can use postpetition financing
arrangements to increase the so-called secured debt hurdle, or the
amount of secured debt that the debtor's enterprise value must
exceed before unsecured creditors and equity security holders will
be entitled to a distribution.325 By increasing the secured debt
hurdle through postpetition extensions of credit, debtors and their
senior secured lenders are able to mitigate economic and legal
uncertainty during the pendency of the case and streamline
confirmation of the plan. And, as Horsehead reveals, postpetition
lenders do not even have to extend all of the funds during the
pendency of the case; rather, mere commitments for new
postconfirmation equity funding can also be used to increase the
valuation hurdle.
324 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 364 (authorizing lenders to secure senior or equal liens on the
property of a debtor's estate).
325 See, e.g., Debtors' Post-Trial Brief in Support of Debtors' Amended Joint Prearranged
Chapter 11 Plan Dated September 4, 2015 (SSBT Issues), at 2-4, In re Boomerang Tube,




All of this suggests, then, that postpetition financing
agreements should not be looked upon by courts merely as debt
instrumentS326 entered into by naturally opposing parties. Courts
and lawmakers should recognize the potential for these
instruments-particularly when executed in tandem with equity
participation and support agreements-to serve as agreements
between debtors and certain stakeholders to pursue sub rosa
plans. Collectively, these agreements give certain creditors
excessive control over the debtor and its assets. And, while it is
true that the plan is still subject to the regular confirmation
process, these statutory safeguards are often illusory. For one
thing, shareholders may be denied a seat at the table; and, in any
case, junior stakeholders only really have the right to contest
valuation.327 But valuation is already difficult to ascertain in
bearish bankruptcies, particularly given the limitations of
prevailing corporate valuation techniques.328  Finally, even if
junior stakeholders are able to overcome the weight of the debtor's
evidence, their efforts will be futile if the debtor can simply use
postpetition debt and equity commitment agreements to push the
valuation hurdle higher and higher. These dangers exist in all
commercial bankruptcies, but they are particularly significant in
bearish bankruptcies, where there are strong economic incentives
to quickly lay claim to valuable, unprotected upside rights. When
postpetition financing arrangements are used in this way, they
have the potential to impermissibly alter the Chapter 11 process
from one designed to maximize value for all stakeholders to one
explicitly fashioned for the sole benefit of certain stakeholders.
326 The point of this Article is not to challenge the bona fide nature of the prototypical
postpetition financing instrument for all purposes. Rather, the analysis is intended to
challenge the assumptions reflected in the law governing these arrangements, and to
provide a unique vantage point from which to assess the true risks they pose to
fundamental fairness, equality of treatment, and the overall efficacy of the commercial
restructuring process-particularly in bearish bankruptcies.
327 See, e.g., In re Granite Broad. Corp., 369 B.R. 120, 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(demonstrating an objection to valuation and holding that "[t]here is no dispute that a class
of creditors cannot receive more than full consideration for its claims, and that excess value
must be allocated to the junior class of debtor or equality").




This Article shows how bearish bankruptcies exploit existing
weaknesses in Chapter 11 to transfer valuable upside rights from
shareholders to certain stakeholders without compensation. The
findings have the potential to redirect bankruptcy reform efforts in
dramatic ways. Courts and lawmakers should address the
problem through careful reconsideration of bankruptcy law and
practice. Reforms are necessary to improve the fairness and
efficacy of the commercial bankruptcy process,329 and to restore the
investing public's faith in Chapter 11 as a legitimate means of
reorganizing distressed firms.
First and foremost, courts and U.S. Trustees should take steps to
identify at the commencement of a Chapter 11 case whether the
majority of the debtor's earnings is exposed to one or more
commodity markets. For ease of determination, the voluntary
petition form could include boxes that debtors would check to
indicate whether they meet this criteria. Simply by acknowledging
that it is dealing with a bearish bankruptcy, a court is more likely to
understand the unique incentive effects that may drive debtors and
other stakeholders to pursue certain restructuring outcomes.
Courts presiding over bearish bankruptcies should also take
special steps to protect residual claimants, including shareholders.
U.S. Trustees should be required to conduct a meeting of equity
security holders at the same time that they conduct a creditors
meeting, and they should be required to form official committees
for unsecured creditors, on the one hand, and equity security
holders, on the other, in the earliest days of the case. The
unsecured creditors committee cannot be expected to represent
equity holders. Particularly in bearish bankruptcies that
329 Such goals are consistent with both Congress's and the Supreme Court's stated
intentions for the Bankruptcy Code specifically and bankruptcy law more broadly. As the
Supreme Court has repeatedly explained, a principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to
provide debtors and creditors with the "prompt and effectual administration and settlement of
the [debtor's] estate." Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966) (quoting Ex parte Christy,
44 U.S. 292, 312 (1845)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995) (noting
that Congress granted bankruptcy courts with comprehensive jurisdiction so "they might deal
efficiently and expeditiously" with bankruptcy matters (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743
F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984))). Similarly, "[e]ase and centrality of administration are thus
foundational characteristics of bankruptcy law." French v. Liebmann (In re French), 440 F.3d
145, 155 (4th Cir. 2006) (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
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contemplate debt-to-equity swaps, these junior stakeholders
struggle enough to advance their own interests and may
ultimately be incentivized to support the debtor's low valuation
estimates in exchange for some portion of the equity in the
reorganized company. A bearish debtor's claims of hopeless
insolvency should have no bearing in the decision to appoint an
official equity committee, as economic theory-and the debtor's
own decision to reorganize rather than liquidate-suggest that
equity's option right may have substantial value. In other words,
because shareholders normally have a right to the debtor's
unlimited upside potential after all creditor claims are satisfied,
and because prevailing corporate valuation techniques may not
fully reflect the debtor's upside potential, shareholders should be
deemed to have an economic stake in the proceedings
notwithstanding the debtor's balance sheet or its claims of
hopeless insolvency.
As a general matter, bankruptcy courts, U.S. Trustees, and the
SEC should be mindful of the unique concerns of shareholders of
bearish debtors, and should carefully monitor the debtor's
disclosures and decisions in these cases. In particular, courts
should not rely on hypothetical liquidation analyses to determine
whether cramdowns are fair and equitable; by definition,
hypothetical liquidation analyses ignore the upside potential and
thus decline to take into account equity's potentially valuable
option right. Where a bearish debtor and its senior creditors
deliberately pursue reorganization rather than liquidation in the
hopes of weathering a downturn in commodity prices, it seems
anything but fair and equitable to use hypothetical liquidation
values as a benchmark for determining whether existing equity
owners are being treated appropriately. Indeed, there is a strong
case to be made that there should never be an equity cramdown in
bearish bankruptcies: debtors should be required to leave existing
equity interests intact and use other instruments-such as
preferred stock or new debt contracts-to restructure their
obligations. Alternatively, bearish debtors should be required to
attempt a public rights issue,330 with the bankruptcy court
overseeing a competitive bid process for underwriting, or they
3 The basic mechanics of a rights issue are described in MARK MOBIUS, EQUITIES: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE CORE CONCEPTS 77-78 (2007).
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must agree to issue options or warrants entitling existing
shareholders to receive equity interests in the reorganized
company if the value reaches or exceeds a predetermined
threshold by some future date.331 Devices of this sort reflect a
deeper understanding of how cyclical and self-correcting
commodities markets influence the true value of a bearish debtor.
Bankruptcy courts should be especially mindful of the
limitations of traditional corporate valuation techniques when
applied to commodity-based debtors. Modern accounting practices
reflect a conservative bias that can be easily exploited by debtors
seeking to transfer excess value to dominant or preferred
stakeholders.332 And, in today's commercial bankruptcies where
creditors exert enormous control over the debtor,333 the persistent
focus on earnings as a determinant of enterprise value may no
longer make sense. This is especially true in bearish
bankruptcies, where prevailing methods of assessing value on the
basis of future cash flows fail to fully capture the upside potential
of commodity-based companies. As an alternative, courts could
require that bearish debtors use so-called options pricing
techniques to estimate the value of equity's stake.3 4 Options
pricing models acknowledge the inherent "option characteristics of
equity"; in other words, these approaches recognize that in all
cases, equity will have value, even if the value of the firm falls well
331 The option model was famously explored in Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to
Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 785 (1988) (proposing a corporate
reorganization process pursuant to which stakeholders receive options rather than pure
shares in the reorganized company). More recently, a hypothetical option device was
recommended by the American Bankruptcy Institute's Commission to Study the Reform of
Chapter 11 in published results of its in-depth, three-year study of commercial
restructurings under Chapter 11. Under the proposal, the debtor's fulcrum security would,
in certain cases, receive the so-called redemption option value, meaning the hypothetical
value of an option to purchase the reorganized company and satisfy the senior debt in full.
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INS., 2012-2014 FINAL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 209 (2014).
332 See Dick, supra note 120, at 1496 (explaining the extraordinary power of debtors to
transfer value to preferred stakeholders).
333 The point is eloquently made in Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 92, at 675.
334 This approach has been the subject of considerable recent attention in finance
literature studying commodity markets. See generally, e.g., Kuangyuan Zhang et al., The
Real Option Value of Mining Operations Using Mean-Reverting Commodity Prices, 28 MIN.
ECON. 11 (2015). It was also used to reconsider Chapter 11 reorganization values in Jeremy
Murphy, Bankruptcy Avant-Garde, 19 AM. BANIR. INST. L. REV. 113 (2011).
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below the face value of the outstanding debt.335 While equity's
underlying option may have little value in many Chapter 11 cases,
it should be expected to have substantial value in bearish
bankruptcies. Indeed, some corporate finance scholars comparing
options pricing theory to DCF analyses estimate that the latter
approaches ignore up to one-third of a commodity-based firm's
value.336
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, courts should apply
greater scrutiny to the postpetition financing arrangements and
any related instruments proposed by bearish debtors. Instead of
relying on a permissive business judgment standard, Congress and
the courts should impose stricter controls on the debtor's
postpetition financial decision-making to limit its discretion and
reduce reliance on its own declarations, disclosures, and business
judgments. Courts should scrutinize postpetition financing
transactions and their accompanying equity participation and
support agreements-just as they monitor sales or settlements-to
ensure that they are not actually clever attempts by debtors to
avoid statutory safeguards by engaging in sub rosa plans. To this
end, bankruptcy judges should make regular use of their equitable
powers and impose a balancing test that takes into account the
benefits and detriments of these proposed transactions to the
debtor's other stakeholders.
Of course, there is a strong argument that the transactions
described in this Article are the only-and the most efficient-
mechanisms for rational, value-maximizing distressed companies
to seek much-needed capital and remain in business. It may very
well be that they are driven to pursue bearish bankruptcy
reorganizations during periods in their economic cycle when their
capital structure has become overly restrictive and the equity
markets are more receptive to them than the debt markets.
Indeed, the actions of Horsehead Holding's dominant, self-
interested stakeholders-who agreed to trade their senior debt
33 Aswath Damodaran, Option Pricing Applications in Valuation: Equality Value in
Deeply Troubled Firms, NYU.EDU (Sept. 24, 2017, 4:02 PM), http://people.stern.nyu.edulad
amodar/pdfiles/eqnotes/optequity.pdf.
36 See, e.g., Jason Hall & Shannon Nicholls, Valuation of Mining Projects Using Option
Pricing Techniques, FINSIA J. APPLIED FIN. 2007, at 22 (examining "the difference between
DCF and real options valuation of mining projects").
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positions for equity positions and to also infuse additional equity
capital commitments-certainly suggest that this was the case.3 3 7
But while bearish debtors should be able to pursue these
efficiencies and access needed capital, bankruptcy law requires
that they do so in a fair and equitable manner.33 8 This means that
their subsequent bite at the equity market apple should not be
taken at the expense of existing shareholders, who have already
demonstrated their willingness to invest in the company and
endure this and future bear markets.
VI. CONCLUSION
Modern bankruptcy law and practice generally excludes
shareholders from the Chapter 11 negotiation table and, in so
doing, leaves an important source of value-the rights to the
debtor's unlimited upside potential-wholly unprotected. In the
case of commodity-based firms that enter bankruptcy during a
bearish market, the upside potential may be substantial. Far from
overlooking this source of value, bearish debtors and their
dominant stakeholders use complex and largely misunderstood
commercial arrangements to secure rights to this asset in the
earliest days of the Chapter 11 case. Reforms are needed to
restore the fairness and integrity of the commercial bankruptcy
process. Courts must take steps to identify bearish bankruptcies
and apply a special set of rules that take into account the unique
incentive effects that are present in these cases. Until then,
bankruptcy courts will continue to unwittingly transfer undeniable
sources of value from shareholders to other stakeholders, in
contravention of fundamental bankruptcy and corporate law
theoretical principles.
3 See also Part IV.D.
- 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012).
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